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No. 9, September 1980

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THE MAJOR ROUTES TOWARD DISARMAMENT

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 80 pp 3-14

[Article by V. F. Petrovskiy]

[Text] When the international atmosphere became tense at the turn of the decade as a result of the actions of imperialist forces and their buildup of armaments, the Soviet Union reaffirmed the primary importance of taking effective measures in international forums, including the Disarmament Commission, to curb the arms race and to promote disarmament.

The Soviet position was fully approved in a declaration adopted by a conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact states, held on 14 and 15 May 1980 in the capital of Poland. The socialist countries attempted to give the process of detente new impetus by proposing an extensive program of action aimed at stronger trust, mutual understanding and cooperation in international relations. Advocating the quickest possible conclusion of agreements in all ongoing disarmament talks and the resumption of talks that had been broken off, they again demonstrated their principled and consistent approach to arms race limitation and disarmament.

On 11 April 1980, Soviet Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko sent UN Secretary General K. Waldheim a letter about the objectives of the United Nations' announced second decade of disarmament, in which he set forth a realistic program of measures covering virtually all aspects of the problem of stopping the arms race and effecting disarmament.

This document is particularly significant because it clearly and definitely states that, even now that the United States has exacerbated international relations, the Soviet Union is still determined to do everything within its power to stop the arms race and take real steps toward disarmament.

The letter of the Soviet foreign minister stresses that it is now extremely important for all peace-loving states to not relax, but, on the contrary, make an even greater effort to strengthen peace, eliminate the threat of war and work toward tangible results in the area of arms race curtailment. Even

under present conditions, the principled position of the USSR has not changed. Our nation is willing to limit and to ban, on a mutual basis, by agreement with other states, any type of weapon, provided, naturally, that this will not harm the security of any side. The letter also mentions the importance of resuming and continuing the talks in this sphere which were commenced in recent years at various international forums and on a bilateral basis but were then broken off or postponed for various reasons. The 23 points of the Soviet document represent a thoroughly considered, concrete and, what is most important, realistic program of disarmament measures which should be the focus of attention in the next few years. It covers virtually all aspects of the problem of stopping the arms race, primarily the race for nuclear arms.

The implementation of the proposed measures would give real meaning to the second decade of disarmament and would be a deciding factor in the struggle for lasting peace on earth.

Our country's new program of disarmament measures cogently reaffirms L. I. Brezhnev's statement that we offer a doctrine of consistent struggle for peace and security as an alternative to the "doctrine" of war hysteria and frenzied arms race. This program is completely consistent with the genuine interests of people, who are now demanding, more and more resolutely, that the franctic militarists be stopped, that the spread of nuclear weapons be prohibited and that reliable obstacles be set up to wreck NATO's plans to augment missile stockpiles in Europe.

The letter of the Soviet foreign minister, which was distributed as an official UN document, had widespread repercussions in this international organization and other forums. The constructive and businesslike nature of the peaceable Soviet initiative represents a striking contrast to the constant fluctuations and hypocritical trickery of the Carter Administration's foreign policy line, declared Chairman Ernest de Mayo of the World Federation of Trade Unions in the United Nations.

While U.S. ruling circles were babbling about their supposed desire for peace and disarmament but were actually making claims to world supremacy, the Soviet Union again demonstrated conclusively to the entire world that its hope of consolidating international security is not a response to current conditions, but a firm and consistent policy.

"Disarmament is the socialist ideal."[1] Lenin's brief formula expresses the quintessence of the socialist world's attitude toward the problem of disarmament. For socialism, disarmament is primarily a material guarantee of peace--that is, the creation of supremely favorable conditions in the international arena for the completion of the historic mission of the working class: the construction of communism.

After the comprehensive and constructive program of total disarmament, unprecedented in mankind's history, was announced in Genoa in April 1922, the Soviet Government initiated the Moscow conference on arms limitation, held on 2-12 December 1922.

In spite of the Soviet Government's skeptical views on the activities of the League of Nations, the Soviet Union defended the cause of peace and attempted to begin the process of real disarmament by accepting an invitation in 1927 to assist in preparation for a world disarmament conference in Geneva.

In 1928 the Soviet delegation in Geneva sent the secretary general of the League of Nations the text of a "draft convention on immediate, total and universal disarmament," which proposed the dismissal of the personnel of land, naval and air forces, the destruction of all weapons and ammunition, the dismantling of all naval and air force vessels, the prohibition of military service, the destruction of strongholds and of naval and airforce bases, the closure of military plants, the curtailment of military equipment manufacture, the dissolution of military departments, the abolition of general headquarters and various types of military administrations and academic institutions, the cessation of military patenting, et cetera.

For the first time in history, the government of a great power made specific and definite proposals regarding total and universal disarmament. Since that time, the struggle for disarmament has been specific in nature.

The Soviet Union also tried to use the world disarmament conference in Geneva in 1932 and 1934 to advance the cause of disarmament and to prevent the rise of fascist aggression. But the conference was unproductive. The bourgeois states were obviously gambling on the war as a pretext for a new imperialist division of the world.

Although it was essentially impossible to make any kind of real progress in the area of disarmament before the war, Soviet diplomacy's tireless and persistent efforts laid a solid foundation, under the difficult conditions of capitalist encirclement, for a broader and more intense struggle for peace and disarmament in our time.

A new stage in the Soviet Union's struggle to limit the arms race and to effect disarmament began when World War II ended. At the basis of this struggle lay a new balance of power between the two socioeconomic systems. The socialist world became a powerful factor which could not be ignored when decisions were made on questions of postwar reconstruction or on any other political problems. But the most important feature of this era was the fact that the historic initiative of raising disarmament issues passed completely to the socialist countries.

The leading role in this joint struggle of the nations of the socialist community has been played by the Soviet Union. Since the end of the war, it has submitted more than 100 proposals at international forums in regard to the basic ways of consolidating world peace, security and disarmament, formulating both the final goal (universal and total disarmament) and individual steps toward its attainment.

An important place in the system of all disarmament talks is occupied by the Disarmament Commission, which was founded in 1961 and which meets in Geneva.[2] This is where specific agreements are reached on aspects of disarmament (in contrast to the United Nations, where these problems are only discussed in more general terms).

The Disarmament Commission has accomplished a great deal since its founding. Some of the results have been international treaties worked out by the commission and subsequently signed and enacted--the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, the treaty prohibiting the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and the ocean floor, the convention banning the use and stockpiling of biological weapons and the convention prohibiting actions to affect the environment for military purposes.

Now the Disarmament Commission has new objectives--it must effect a definite turning point in the struggle to stop the arms race and quickly bring all issues on the agenda to a successful conclusion.

Unfortunately, the U.S. and NATO policy of exacerbating international relations and China's opposition to any and all disarmament measures have had a negative effect on the work of the commission (as demonstrated at the 1980 spring session, in which, as a result of China's participation, all five nuclear powers were represented for the first time). Several countries, particularly the United States and China, raised questions in the commission that were totally outside its authority. For obviously anti-Soviet purposes, for example, they tried to involve the commission in a discussion of issues concerning Afghanistan, to give one of Pol Pot's representatives a chance to speak at the meeting and to prevent Vietnam from participating in the work of the commission. Too much time was spent on the discussion of organizational procedural matters.

In spite of this, after prolonged procrastination, the commission was able, largely due to the efforts of the socialist states, to pass a resolution on the creation of four task forces to thoroughly investigate the question of measures to safeguard the non-nuclear states against the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons; on a comprehensive disarmament program, the drafting of which should be completed prior to the second special session of the UN General Assembly on disarmament; on radiological and chemical weapons. Along with the other socialist countries, the Soviet Union is fully determined to continue promoting the concrete and constructive investigation of all urgent problems by the commission.

At present, now that nuclear weapons represent the greatest danger to mankind, the most important aspect of disarmament is the termination of the race for nuclear weapons and a transition to disarmament in the nuclear sphere. According to the data of the "Club of Rome,"[3] by 1974 the United States had accumulated nuclear weapons equivalent to 615,385 of the bombs

dropped on Hiroshima. Judging by the number of victims of the August 1945 catastrophe, this signifies (theoretically) the ability to destroy the present population of the world 12 times over.[4] Nevertheless, the nuclear race started by the West is still going on.

The Soviet Union has always advocated the prohibition of nuclear weapons and the exclusion of these weapons forever from the arsenals of states, both when it did not have these weapons and when it was forced to manufacture them and equip its armed forces with them for defense purposes.

Continuing and developing the Soviet Union's invariable line, free of temporary fluctuations, in regard to questions of nuclear disarmament, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium L. I. Brezhnev proposed a new initiative on 2 November 1977. "Today," L. I. Brezhnev announced, "we propose a radical step: agreement on the simultaneous cessation of nuclear armament production by all states. This would cover all nuclear weapons--atomic, hydrogen and neutron bombs and missiles. The nuclear powers could simultaneously pledge to begin the gradual reduction of existing stockpiles, progressing toward their complete, '100-percent' liquidation."[5]

By proposing the cessation of the race for nuclear weapons as a first step, the Soviet initiative creates the necessary starting point for subsequent moves in the direction of their reduction. Another important aspect of this initiative is that it envisages, along with the process of limiting nuclear weapons, the reinforcement of international legal guarantees of the security of states and, in particular, a world treaty on non-aggression in international relations. This confirms the essence of all past Soviet proposals, which is that the reduction of nuclear weapons should be accompanied by the guarantee and reinforcement of the security of all states.

In an attempt to put this matter on the practical level, the Soviet Union proposed in May 1978, at the special session of the UN General Assembly on disarmament, the commencement of negotiations on the termination of the production of nuclear weapons of all types and the gradual reduction of stockpiles to the point of their complete liquidation. It was particularly stressed that all nuclear powers should be represented in the negotiations. It was also noted that some non-nuclear states could also attend the talks.

In the Soviet Union's view, a sizable and extremely complex set of issues must be discussed at these talks: the ways of accomplishing the termination of nuclear weapon production and of organizing the gradual reduction of stockpiles, the stages or phases of this work, the scales on which individual nuclear powers should become involved in this process at each stage with a view to differences in their levels of military nuclear potential, and the ways of avoiding the disruption of the present balance of nuclear strength while constantly lowering its level.

It is extremely indicative that the 34th Session of the UN General Assembly advocated the quickest possible commencement of nuclear disarmament talks.

At an extended meeting of the Disarmament Commission in January 1979, the Soviet delegation proposed the assignment of priority to measures aimed at prohibiting and liquidating nuclear weapons. On 6 February the delegations representing the USSR, Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Mongolia, Poland and Czechoslovakia submitted a working paper on negotiations to the commission in regard to the termination of the production of nuclear weapons of all types and the gradual reduction of stockpiles to the point of their complete liquidation. Stressing the urgent need to stop and reverse the race for nuclear weapons, the socialist countries proposed the immediate commencement of preparatory consultations.

The nuclear disarmament proposal of the socialist countries was assigned first place in the commission's operational program, which confirmed the urgency and importance of this initiative. It was discussed on 19-23 April 1979.

During the discussion the initiative of the socialist countries was widely supported by Algeria, Ethiopia, Nigeria, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Sweden and many other commission members. The non-aligned and neutral countries applauded this proposal as a clarification and amplification of the decisions of the special session of the UN General Assembly on the most pressing disarmament issues--nuclear disarmament.

Representatives of the Western NATO countries took the widespread support of the nuclear disarmament proposal into account and did not take the risk of openly opposing it. A note of obvious discord could be heard in the speech of the U.S. delegate, who implied that there was no need for nuclear disarmament talks. This statement was interpreted as U.S. reluctance to take real steps toward nuclear disarmament. As the discussion continued, the Americans had to change their tone somewhat.

The Soviet Union believes that the problem of nuclear disarmament is complex but not insurmountable. The sincerity of intensions to free mankind from the danger of nuclear war must be proved by actions, and not by words. The implementation of the Soviet nuclear disarmament proposals would give the process of detente strong impetus and would stop the arms race. Its chief result, however, would be the creation of real possibilities for the commencement, once and for all, of the physical reduction of stockpiles of one of the most dangerous and deadly types of weapons of mass destruction.

In addition to advocating this radical solution--the prohibition of nuclear weapons forever and the exclusion of these weapons from the arsenals of states with a simultaneous ban on the use of force in general--the Soviet Union is also proposing partial steps in this direction.

One such Soviet proposal concerns the conclusion of an international convention on the non-use of nuclear weapons against states which have declined to produce and acquire nuclear weapons and do not have them within their territory. The draft of this convention, submitted by the Soviet Union, was turned over to the Disarmament Commission along with other proposals of this kind after they had been discussed in the United Nations.

The conclusion of the international agreement proposed by the USSR on the non-deployment of nuclear weapons within the territory of states where they do not now exist could also become this kind of action.

A universal and complete nuclear test ban is among the commission agenda items of primary significance for the cessation of the nuclear arms race. In 1963, as we know, a treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and underwater was drafted and signed in Moscow. At that time, the USSR proposed the prohibition of underground tests as well, but this idea aroused no sympathy in the Western negotiating partners. In 1974 the Soviet Union and the United States signed a treaty limiting underground nuclear tests, establishing a 150-kiloton underground nuclear test ceiling. Another step in this direction was the treaty concluded in 1976 by the USSR and the United States on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, which established specific rules governing these explosions. In these agreements, however, the objective of stopping underground tests was only partially attained. For the radical resolution of this issue, the USSR drafted a treaty on a universal and total nuclear test ban and submitted the draft to the United Nations in 1975. The Soviet initiative was supported by the majority of states: Almost 100 delegates voted in favor of this proposal in the United Nations. The General Assembly requested the nuclear powers to commence negotiations, with the participation of a group of non-nuclear countries, for the purpose of concluding this kind of treaty.

The question of a nuclear test ban has been the subject of continuous discussion in the United Nations, in the Disarmament Commission and at the Geneva talks between the USSR, United States and Great Britain.

In order to clear the way for a constructive agreement on the toal and universal prohibition of nuclear tests, the Soviet Union has recently taken several steps in the particular direction that were connected with the greatest difficulties. Consent has been given to verification on a voluntary basis, the establishment of a moratorium on peaceful nuclear explosions, and the enactment of the treaty even in the event that the parties to this treaty are not all five of the nuclear powers, but only three--the USSR, the United States and Great Britain. In doing this, the Soviet Union was guided by a desire to quickly complete the drafting of this treaty and sign it.

But the drafting of an agreement on the universal and total prohibition of nuclear tests is still being delayed. This is the fault of the Western negotiating partners, whose policy is distinguished by numerous fluctuations. The reason for all these fluctuations becomes absolutely obvious after a

reading of statements by representatives of the Pentagon and some other American federal departments, openly opposing the termination of all U.S. nuclear tests.[6]

The nuclear test ban issue on the agenda of the Disarmament Commission is awaiting its quick resolution. The Soviet Union, which was the first to propose a nuclear test ban, is making every effort to accomplish the final goal--the prohibition of all nuclear tests without exception.

Within the context of measures to prevent a world thermonuclear war, the reinforcement of nuclear non-proliferation regulations has been assigned considerable significance by the Soviet Union.

An important role in the establishment of the principle of nuclear non-proliferation as a standard in international life is being played by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which was drawn up in the Disarmament Commission with the USSR playing an active part and which has now being signed by 112 states. The 10-year period during which the treaty has been in effect has proved that it is a necessary and useful means of strengthening general security and preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons also represents a solid foundation for international cooperation in the peaceful use of atomic energy. It not only serves the security interests of states, but also promotes their economic development. Nonetheless, more than 30 countries have still not signed the treaty. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by states located in explosive parts of the world would be particularly dangerous. A nuclear conflict that flares up in any of these regions could become the detonator of a worldwide nuclear confrontation. The reports of plans to develop nuclear weapons in South Africa, Israel and Pakistan are deeply disturbing for this reason.

There is no question that one of the reasons these countries have refused to sign the non-proliferation treaty is the assistance the Western countries are giving them in the development of their nuclear programs.

The Soviet Union feels it is of cardinal importance to enhance the effectiveness of the international nuclear non-proliferation regulations specified in the treaty and to broaden the circle of its signatories for the purpose of giving it a truly universal nature. This is particularly important now that the development of scientific, technical and industrial nuclear potential is being accelerated in more and more countries, particularly the development of nuclear power engineering and the international trade in nuclear materials, equipment and technology. According to estimates, around 200 reactors will be operating by 1985 in more than 30 countries which do not have nuclear weapons at present. These reactors could produce up to 30 tons of plutonium a year (8 kilograms of 95-percent plutonium-239 are enough to produce a nuclear warhead with a yield of 20 kilotons).

The USSR is convinced that effective control must be established to prevent the use of the international trade in nuclear materials, equipment and technology for the creation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

An important role in the attainment of these goals is being played by the London agreement on stronger control over the nuclear exports of states supplying nuclear materials, equipment and technology, and the so-called "Club of London,"[7] in the formation of which the Soviet Union played an active part.

The Soviet Union adheres strictly to this agreement when it makes nuclear shipments. The USSR feels that all exporting countries should apply IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards to all of the nuclear activity of non-nuclear importing states.

The Soviet Union realizes that the peaceful use of nuclear energy is indisputably a promising way of solving the energy problem and it is therefore in favor of broader international cooperation in this area on the condition that the possibility of its use to augment possibilities for the creation of nuclear weapons be excluded.

The Soviet Union believes that the creation of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world will reduce the danger of nuclear war and strengthen nuclear non-proliferation regulations. The credit for this idea must be given to the USSR. The Polish People's Republic contributed a great deal to the development of the idea of nuclear-free zones in Europe.

The USSR is in favor of turning the Indian Ocean into a genuine zone of peace. The Soviet Union has wholeheartedly supported the proposals to create nuclear-free zones and zones of peace in various regions—in central and northern Europe, in the Middle East, in Africa and so forth. These proposals have still not been implemented because they have been opposed by the Western powers.

Proceeding from its principled position of supporting the desire of states in various regions to keep nuclear weapons out of their territory, the Soviet Union ratified the second supplementary protocol to a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons in Latin American in December 1978 (the Tlatelolco Treaty).

Although the cessation of the race for nuclear weapons, followed by nuclear disarmament, is the most important aspect of the Soviet Union's work in the Disarmament Commission and other international forums, it is not the only one.

The Soviet Union has been just as adamant in its efforts to promote a ban on other weapons of mass destruction. Another pressing problem concerns the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, which can be categorized along with nuclear and bacteriological weapons as the most dangerous means of waging war.

As early as 1972, the Soviet Union and a number of other socialist states submitted a draft convention to the Disarmament Commission on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. At the end of 1976, Soviet-American talks on this problem were instituted within the commission framework. During the course of these talks, the two sides agreed that the future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons should pursue, as the Soviet Union and other socialist countries had proposed from the very beginning, the goals of completely prohibiting the development, production and accumulation of all types of chemical weapons and liquidating stockpiles of these weapons. The USSR and United States concluded that the fulfillment of obligations taken on in line with the future convention would be subject to the proper verification. The two sides also agreed on several specific issues connected with the declaration of existing stockpiles of chemical weapons and the means of their production and with their subsequent liquidation.

On the whole, however, the bilateral Soviet-American talks are taking too long. This cannot be viewed as normal, as the difficulties which still exist in connection with several aspects of control and other matters are not insoluble.

The Soviet Union's struggle for a ban on weapons of mass destruction is not limited to mere proposals concerning existing types and systems of these weapons. The Soviet Union feels it is exceptionally important to prevent the development and production of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction that are not part of the arsenal of states as yet.

In 1975 the Soviet Union proposed the conclusion of an international agreement to prohibit the development and production of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction. It was motivated by a desire to stop the use of scientific and technical discoveries for the creation of new dangerous types of weapons, which could be comparable or even superior to nuclear, chemical or bacteriological weapons in terms of destructive potential. The Soviet proposal aroused the interest of many states and the entire world public and won the approval of the 30th Session of the UN General Assembly, which ordered the Disarmament Commission to investigate this matter and draft a suitable international agreement.

The Western delegations at the talks, essentially wishing to avoid the thorough investigation of the matter, used various excuses to disagree with the criteria suggested by the Soviet Union to define new weapons of mass destruction, but did not propose anything constructive in exchange. From the very beginning, the West essentially resisted the universal prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction and made every effort to restrict the possible sphere of their prohibition by limiting it to isolated types and systems of weapons.

In August 1977 the USSR compiled a more precise draft agreement based on the results of the Geneva debates. The Soviet Union proposed that the

category of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction include weapons which could be created in the future with the aid of either known scientific and technical principles that have not been used as yet, either individually or in conjunction with one another, to create weapons of mass destruction, or scientific and technical principles which might be discovered in the future and which might have properties similar to, or stronger than, known types of weapons of mass destruction in terms of their destructive and/or devastating effect.

In addition to the definition and specific list of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction subject to prohibition, the Soviet draft agreement also stipulates that it will be possible to conclude individual agreements on the prohibition of specific weapons of mass destruction in addition to the comprehensive agreement banning the development and production of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction.

In 1978 the Soviet Union submitted a new proposal regarding the establishment, as part of the Disarmament Commission, of a special group of scientific experts representing the states belonging to the commission to investigate possible avenues for the creation of new types of weapons of mass destruction, which will then be included in the original list of prohibited weapons in the comprehensive agreement.

The prohibition of neutron weapons is acquiring particular significance. According to many Western experts, the neutron weapon will lower the nuclear threshold, increase the probability of nuclear war and pose a serious danger to mankind.

On 14 March 1978 the USSR, in conjunction with other socialist countries, submitted a draft convention on the prohibition of neutron weapons to the Disarmament Commission. According to this convention, all states party to the document would pledge to not produce, accumulate or deploy these weapons anywhere or to use them.

A ban on radiological weapons could become an important measure preventing the use of scientific and technical progress for the creation of new weapons of mass destruction. The development of this kind of weapon would be exceptionally dangerous for mankind.

For several years, the USSR and United States conducted bilateral talks on the prevention of the development of radiological weapons within the framework of steps to prohibit the creation of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. These intensive negotiations produced positive results, and in June 1979, during the Vienna summit meeting, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium L. I. Brezhnev and U.S. President J. Carter happily confirmed that the two sides had reached an agreement on the chief elements of the treaty prohibiting the development, production, accumulation and use of radiological weapons. The USSR and United States later submitted a joint proposal on

this matter to the Disarmament Commission. In accordance with a resolution of the 34th Session of the UN General Assembly, the commission must begin to draft an international treaty on the banning of radiological weapons.

Although the Soviet Union is primarily concerned with the limitation and prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear arms, it does not underestimate the importance of limiting so-called conventional--that is, non-nuclear--weapons, particularly since many of these weapons now have tremendous destructive force, and expenditures on conventional weapons constitute four-fifths of world military expenditures.

The Soviet Union hopes for the curtailment of the development of new types of conventional weapons with considerable destructive force and favors the conclusion of an agreement prohibiting the augmentation of conventional weapon stockpiles by all of the permanent members of the UN Security Council and the countries connected with them by military agreements.

The Soviet Union views the reduction of military budgets as one of the most effective and relatively simple ways of curbing and then stopping the arms race.

On the initiative of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, the UN General Assembly has repeatedly advocated this kind of reduction and the use of part of the funds thus conserved to assist the developing countries. The discussion pertained to the reduction of primarily the military budgets of the permanent members of the Security Council by a specific percentage, the same for all of these states. No action has been taken as yet on this decision because some states, including some permanent members of the Security Council, are actually obstructing the implementation of this proposal, particularly by making references to the incomparability of the military budgets of different states.

In an attempt to simplify the resolution of this problem, the Soviet Union proposed at the special session of the UN General Assembly on disarmament that the states with the greatest economic military potential, including all of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, agree on the specific amounts by which each would reduce its military budget, in absolute terms instead of a percentage. An agreement could simultaneously be reached on the specific amount that each state could contribute to the developing countries after reducing its own military budget.

These proposals, particularly the idea of reducing military budgets in absolute terms, have been widely supported in the United Nations, which annually considers the reduction of military budgets.

The Soviet Union, therefore, has proposed a concrete program of action covering all of the topics discussed by the Disarmament Commission in Geneva.

The Disarmament Commission is only one of the forums in which the Soviet Union is resolutely and consistently working toward a radical reversal in the development of international relations: a move from the arms race and military tension to military detente and the radical reduction of the danger of war. In a multitude of other international, regional and bilateral talks, the Soviet Union is acting just as energetically, taking the initiative and promoting significant steps in the direction of real disarmament.

In their constant struggle to stop the arms race, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have always demonstrated their willingness to go as far as their negotiating partners are prepared to go in this area.

The complex of disarmament measures proposed by the Soviet Union is aimed primarily at heightening the security of states and lowering the level of military confrontation. The cessation of the arms race and the liquidation of stockpiles of nuclear and conventional weapons should ultimately bring about mankind's cherished dream--universal and total disarmament under strict international control. This will not only eliminate the physical danger of war, but will also make colossal resources available for the resolution of national and global problems.

The international complications encountered by the world at the turn of the decade make it all the more important to hang on to recent achievements in the sphere of arms race limitation and to continue negotiations for the purpose of further progress in this sphere. The system of disarmament talks, which has taken shape as a result of prolonged effort by certain states, must not be disrupted to benefit militaristic circles and the personal political interests of specific individuals in the West. Many of these talks are progressing rapidly, with the discussion no longer centering around general ideas, but matters of a specifically military nature. Along with the Soviet-American SALT II Treaty, which is awaiting its ratification, the talks on the total and universal nuclear test ban and the ban on radiological weapons are close to completion. All of the necessary prerequisites exist for the successful completion of the talks on the prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of stockpiles of these weapons, on the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states with no weapons of this type within their territory, and on the non-deployment of nuclear weapons in states where they do not now exist. Naturally, many difficulties still exist.

In spite of the complexity and delicacy of the topics being discussed, however, there is every possibility that these matters will be settled in ways advancing the cause of disarmament without harming the national security interests of the sides involved and without changing the balance of power between states to the advantage of some and the disadvantage of others.

The entire history of the disarmament talks conclusively proves that the main requirement is the desire, willingness and determination of all parties

to conclude practical agreements. The latest initiatives of the Soviet Union, aimed at reducing international tension and establishing real possibilities for arms race limitation, represent new and eloquent proof of its firm intention to put the matter of disarmament on a practical level.

Naturally, a great deal also depends on the position of the United States, the strongest military power in the West. It is unlikely that there could be any progress in the sphere of disarmament without constructive participation by the United States. This imposes a great responsibility on this nation. The entire world is waiting to see if the leaders of the United States will display political wisdom and a sober approach, taking existing realities into account, or if temporary considerations and the desire to return to politics "from a position of strength" will prevail. This will also decide the fate of detente, with which millions of people associate their hope for a peaceful future, and will affect America's reputation as a serious negotiating partner, whose word can be trusted and who will not go against international agreements to satisfy temporary political whims.

FOOTNOTES

1. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 30, p 152.

2. In accordance with an agreement reached during the Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament and reflected in its final document, 40 states now belong to the Disarmament Commission--35 nonnuclear states and all 5 of the states possessing nuclear weapons.

3. An organization of scholars from Western Europe, the United States and Canada for the study of problems in future world affairs.

4. "Reviewing International Order," The Club of Rome Project, Rotterdam, 1975, pp XV-1.

5. L. I. Brezhnev. "Leninskim kursom" [Following Lenin's Course], vol 6, Moscow, 1978, p 596.

6. See, for example, FOREIGN POLICY, No 36, Fall 1979.

7. The countries represented in the "Club of London," which unites nuclear-exporting nations, are the USSR, the United States, Canada, England, Italy, France, the GDR, Poland, the CSSR, the FRG, Japan, Sweden, Belgium, Holland and Switzerland.

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TWO IMAGES OF THE PRESIDENT: FROM MORALISM TO JINGOISM

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 80 pp 15-25

[Article by V. P. Shestakov]

[Text] The moral factor plays a significant role in politics and ideology today, particularly when foreign policy decisions are being made and political methods are being justified. As Soviet researchers Yu. A. Zamoshkin and A. Yu. Mel'vil' point out, politics, morals and ideology, which represent essentially objective tendencies, the contradictions and problems of concrete history, the dynamics of socioeconomic structures and the interests of social groups and classes, are relatively independent in their development and interact with one another intensively. The mechanism of motivation and the purpose of political actions cannot be understood without consideration for the moral and ideological factor.[1]

In recent years, the problem of the moral factor in politics has become a special field of study. A more specific aspect of this problem is connected with the significance and role of moral ethics in politics.[2]

Most American researchers believe that moralism is a characteristic feature of U.S. foreign policy. Political scientist J. Guinter, for example, argues that the moralist and the manager have always been the two leading figures in American politics. For the manager, government is always neutral in regard to morals; its sphere consists of economics and "pure" politics. The moralist, on the other hand, maintains that morality is a necessary sphere of politics and must dictate certain principles of political behavior and judgment.[3] In this connection, D. Bell, a prominent American sociologist with a conservative outlook, writes the following: "Although we Americans are becoming more tolerant in the area of traditional morality, we are turning into moralists and extremists in the area of politics."[4] S. Lipset feels that Americans are more likely than Europeans to "study politics with the aid of moralistic terminology" and tend toward "moral extremism." Finally, P. Steinfels, editor-in-chief of COMMONWEAL magazine, has stated that moralism is a distinctive feature of a characteristic American ideological current of recent years--the neoconservative current.[5]

All of this is arousing the interest of researchers in the characteristics of moralism as it is interpreted, depicted and utilized by Washington politicians, and in its evolution and role in U.S. foreign policy.

Various combinations of "American-style" moralism and pragmatism can be discerned in the history of American foreign policy. Some administrations, as, for example, those of R. Nixon and G. Ford, have asserted their determination to "purge" foreign policy of all moralistic considerations, for the purpose of, in Kissinger's words, "soberly looking reality in the face."[6] In contrast, the present administration, headed by J. Carter, has proclaimed the moral principle the basis of its foreign policy, declaring the "primacy of morality" in the system of international relations. This is how the creation of Carter's "image"[7] as President began.

From the very beginning, however, Carter's moralism was nothing other than a tactical ruse, a method of disguising purely pragmatic goals. This ruse was originally intended to alleviate the mass dissatisfaction in the nation with mounting amorality in the higher echelons of government and business, and to take advantage of the "average American's" desire to strengthen "traditional American moral values."

It should be stressed that moralism, which was used as a working slogan of American foreign policy even in the past, has never had anything in common with morality as such. Moralism is the ritualistic use of moral symbols, an imitation of morality, representing, in essence, a theatrical dramatization of politics, and not a way of solving real problems.

This has been admitted even by many American writers. For example, prominent American political scientist E. Lefever, expert on moral issues and foreign policy, describes the essence of moralism in Washington policy in the following way: "Moralism is an imitation of morality, a partial code of ethics. Quite often, moralism is expressed in self-satisfied rhetoric or in manipulative symbols intended to justify something, judge something or deceive someone, but not to inform, inspire or serve the truth. Moralism has a tendency to focus attention more on particular than on general interests, more on feelings than on reason, on something immediate that is gained at the cost of losing the future. It is usually concerned more with external form than with consistent logic. Morality is a synonym for responsibility, but moralism is the conscious or unconscious escape from responsibility."[8]

It is in this context that the moralism of the present administration's foreign policy should be examined. It was no coincidence that J. Carter turned to this kind of moralism, fashioning it into a political platform during this campaign. He arrived in the White House at a time when the American public's faith in government institutions had been drastically undermined by the Watergate scandal and the war in Vietnam. This diminished the prestige of the presidency and aroused a mistrust of government institutions and of the ethics of American politics in general. Taking this into

consideration, J. Carter promised to clean up morals and invoked the "traditional system of values."

It is indicative that J. Carter singled out a particular element of this system of values, a traditional symbol of American hope, hope for a better life and success--the "American dream." "We Americans still have common dreams. Neither Vietnam, nor Watergate nor the difficulties of a shaky economy can change this. Some of our dreams are easily described but much more difficult to develop. They include the belief that all Americans should be equal before the law, that our nation should serve other nations as an example of courage, concern for others and respect for basic human rights, and that the government should be controlled by our citizens, and not vice-versa."[9]

These statements by Carter are a typical example of campaign rhetoric, in which the basic principles of moralism as his "personal political program" could already be seen. These principles were based on the following three postulates: 1) the elevation of U.S. prestige in the world and the restoration of faith in the government within the nation; 2) the campaign "in defense of human rights"; 3) the revival of "traditional national values" and the rebirth of the "American dream."

We find these elements of general moralistic doctrine in Carter's inauguration speech as well (20 January 1977). He returns to the theme of the "American dream," which he interprets as a supraclass national concept, promising prosperity to each American without exception. "Today I do not want," J. Carter said, "to proclaim some kind of new dream. I want to appeal for a renewal of faith in our old dream." It was no coincidence that the new president placed emphasis on the "old" dream, pointing up the conservative nature of his program and its connection with the "traditional system of values," which he wanted to revive, and not to reform.

It is true that Carter quite unexpectedly declared in this speech that the concept of the "American dream" meant faith in government as well as in a better future for America. Abstract moralistic rhetoric is combined here with pragmatism, with an attempt to strengthen his "image" as a president who embodied the traditional dreams and hopes of the American people. "The American dream is eternal. We must renew our complete faith in our country and in one another. I believe that America could be better than it is. We must be stronger than before. Let our past mistakes force us to return to the fundamental principles of our nation, because we know that if we despise our government we can have no future." In other words, the President was informing the people who had elected him that they could not expect a better future if they did not believe in him.

In this speech, Carter combined appeals for the revival of the old "American dream" with abstract statements about "class harmony" ("the strong should not persecute the weak") and with slogans in defense of human rights, which he had declared the principles of his foreign policy from the very beginning.

In this way the Carter brand of moralism was reaffirmed, and its author stood before the American people in the position of a moralist. This was important stage in the "building" of Carter's presidential "image," which had been designed far in advance and carefully fashioned by experts in political advertising.

In his book about "image," renowned American historian D. Boorstin wrote that the idea of heroism had changed considerably in modern America and had been replaced by the concept of "fame." Whereas the hero of the past was created by circumstances and personal effort, fame is created by the mass media. For this reason, Bell says, when a "famous" political figure is discussed in America, people are more inclined to ask who his speechwriter and advertising agent are than to wonder about his personal qualities.

Even during the campaign, Carter and his associates were already demonstrating an excellent awareness of the fact that the political "image" of an American is created by the mass media. This fact acquired even greater significance in their eyes after Carter crossed the threshold of the White House. In an article on Carter's image in the 22 February 1977 issue of the WASHINGTON POST, American journalist Edward Walsh wrote: "In the first month of his term, Carter has already demonstrated his intuitive knowledge of the main feature of the presidency: The White House is a stage and he is the director and the hero. By utilizing the White House public relations staff to the fullest and skillfully guiding its efforts, Carter has already gone a long way toward creating a first-rate image for himself as the 39th President of the United States."

The direct responsibility for creating Carter's "image" was delegated to Press Secretary J. Powell, who oversees the writing of speeches for the President, the work of television reporters and photographers covering White House activities and contacts with all of the mass media. In essence, Walsh wrote, "Powell controls all White House personnel working on strengthening the President's image." What are the specific features of the political image that was created for J. Carter as soon as he took office as President?

During the campaign, Carter was represented primarily as a "farmer," a "nuclear scientist" and a "deeply religious Baptist." All of this was supposed to give the American voters the impression of a simple workingman with high moral standards who was simultaneously a man of experience and a well-educated intellectual.

Just as the majority of the other political images created by professional specialists in political advertising, this image was not based on fact, but on a unique mythology which had little in common with reality. As E. A. Ivanyan remarks, "After J. Carter graduated from the Naval Academy in Annapolis, he received a degree in engineering and, with the exception of a brief stay on an atomic submarine, had no connection with nuclear physics. As for his farming, the millionaire J. Carter, part-owner of his family's

peanut plantation, was more of an 'agribusinessman.'" Citing a statment by American researcher W. Stewart, the author stresses: "If Carter is a farmer, then Henry Ford II is an auto mechanic."[10]

As soon as the image is born and becomes an element of the individual's political career, however, it requires him to act according to this created political mythology. "The role image," Kenneth Boulding writes in his book "The Image," "imposes itself on the individual who takes on this role. When a man becomes the President of the United States, he begins to act like the President of the United States, regardless of his actual character and behavior."[11] Indeed, President Carter followed the rules of political myth creation by always striving to fit the image that was created for him in campaign advertisements.

He displayed the qualities of a good family man and a truly religious person. He promised to be sincere and published a brochure a few months before the election which was even called "I Will Never Lie to You." Carter was lavish with promises. He promised to reform the excessively swollen White House staff, to lower taxes, to do away with inflation and to work toward peace in international relations. All of this was supposed to strengthen his image as a moralistic President. It must be said that the promises the President dispensed so lavishly brought him success at first. A public opinion poll in March 1977 indicated that Carter's popularity had risen considerably since the election. The image was producing results.

Carter, however, cared about more than his personal image as the President. He was equally concerned with strengthening the national image of the United States. The war in Vietnam and Watergate had contributed to a dramatic decline of U.S. prestige throughout the world. This was attested to by numerous public opinion polls in many countries and sociological studies in the United States. The most influential groups in the nation's ruling circles were just as deeply disturbed as the White House by this. There is good reason that a prominent place among the studies mentioned above was occupied by the Committee on Critical Choices for Americans, generously subsidized by the Rockefeller Foundation.[12] It is obvious that this heightened interest in the state of the national image was no coincidence, because it was connected not only and not so much with purely theoretical research, but was of fully practical significance. As for the studies, they indicated that current international relations were closely related to the interaction of national images, and that U.S. foreign policy-makers would have to take this into account.[13]

Political leaders in western Europe (Italy, France, the FRG and the Great Britain), South and North America (Canada, Mexico and Brazil) and Japan were surveyed to determine the national image of the United States. Each of the individuals surveyed was given an opportunity to express his views on the positive and negative aspects of U.S. foreign policy, and the combination was then supposed to convey the foreign policy image of the nation. The following appraisals were made (see tables 1 and 2).

Table 1

Positive Image

	Western Europe	South and North America	Japan
Foreign Policy			
Struggle for peace, desire for arms limitation and detente	17	5	4
Desire to act well in world affairs and assist other countries	12	14	17
Defender of freedom and stronghold against communism endeavoring to defend itself, its allies and other parts of the world	4	2	3
Political and economic strength	6	4	1
Concern for worldwide interests	2	3	9
Other positive features	7	4	3
Domestic Policy			
Democracy, the protection of human rights	20	23	10
Industrial and technical strength	18	20	6
High standard of living and public welfare	6	6	1
Effectiveness of political and socioeconomic system, ability to negotiate and cooperate	15	16	8
The American character: noble, gentle, practical, et cetera	7	10	3
Other positive features	6	12	2
I like everything about the United States	12	9	4

Analyzing these positive and negative appraisals, the committee concluded that the foreign policy image of the United States in 1974 was negative on the whole.

This negative foreign policy image of the United States corresponded to a negative "self-image," connected with Americans' beliefs about themselves and about their nation. Renowned American journalist M. Lerner wrote, for example: "The image that most people had of the United States...included the convulsions and confrontations of the 1960's, the hippie culture, poverty, the bombing raids of the Vietnam war and the corruption uncovered in the Watergate affair. The widespread belief that America has gone off the track at the same time that it, by an ironic coincidence, is approaching its bicentennial in 1976, is a belief that has been reinforced by the self-image of America, filled with self-pity and self-contempt."[14] The decline of the United States' "self-image" was also written about by several other authors.[15]

Table 2

Negative Image

	Western Europe	South and North America	Japan
Foreign Policy			
Political imperialism, world policeman, attempt to play leader	25	5	4
Economic imperialism, exploitation of other nations	12	17	9
Aggressiveness, fear of communism, dependence on military strength	6	5	10
Inexperience and immaturity in international politics	7	7	4
Other negative features	7	10	2
Domestic Policy			
Racism, discrimination against blacks, Mexicans and other minorities	19	19	5
Ineffective social and political system, inability to cope with domestic problems	13	11	1
Corrupt political system	14	10	1
Pragmatism, obsession with the dollar	10	2	3
High crime rate, assassinations, high prices	6	4	2
Negative features of the American character: egotism, conceit, cynicism	8	4	1
Other negative features	3	4	1
I do not like anything about the United States	5	9	8
I do not know or am undecided	9	7	37

All of these studies and statements attest to the deep moral crisis that overtook American society in the mid-1970's and led to the decline of the U.S. image throughout the world and the U.S. self-image within the nation. "The war in Vietnam," J. Carter stressed in a speech at Notre Dame University on 22 May 1977, "undermined the faith of the public in the nation's ability to guarantee its citizens solid well-being. The covert pessimism of some of our leaders widened the credibility gap even more."

To lead the nation out of this crisis and divert the attention of the world public away from the United States' unpopular foreign policy, Carter announced a "policy in defense of human rights." He asserted that "leadership in this area will give us back the moral prestige we once had."

It is indicative that the President is least concerned with the defense of human rights in his own country. This does not keep him from persistently attempting to force his program on all countries and peoples, or, to put it more specifically, to establish the U.S. "right" to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. This was the form taken by the new-found globalism of Washington foreign policy, the attempt to set the United States up as an example in the area of moral standards as well as politics and economics. It was no coincidence that Carter said on 29 December 1977: "We represent the leader in world affairs." This moralism is not an abstract philosophy, but a means of pursuing absolutely definite practical goals, the goals of substantiating the United States' leading role in the world.[16]

It should be noted that some American researchers have interpreted moralism in Carter's foreign policy and his propagandistic rhetoric in regard to human rights protection as a means of imperialist expansion. As J. Petras, for example, remarked: "Moralism in foreign policy is an effective way of slurring over real problems at home." Carter's "new morality" is not so new. "It is intended to consolidate American hegemony, neutralize criticism abroad and win new support for a new confrontation with the anti-imperialist forces of the world."[17]

In 1978 J. Carter began a series of Asian and European trips with an absolutely obvious propagandistic purpose. In accordance with the image he had assumed, he tried to use these trips to strengthen his own prestige and the prestige of the United States. It was no coincidence that he often described these trips as "symbolic" in press conferences. Explaining what he meant by the term "symbolic," Carter said: "This was a trip which symbolized the power, influence and goodwill of the American States. Everywhere I went, I endeavored to stress the concepts of morality, dignity, goodness, friendship and human rights.... In this sense, the trip was symbolic. It symbolized what America represents and what it is striving to become."

In the beginning of 1978, Carter began to assert that the "human rights defense policy" had led the United States out of its moral crisis and had restored its prestige throughout the world. Speaking in Congress on 19 January 1978, he said: "We have gone through a long period of confusion and doubt, but now we have returned to our moral course and, reinspired, we will strive to acquaint the rest of mankind with our best intentions. We are a people full of confidence. We have restored the moral foundation of our foreign policy. The very essence of our national character is a firm commitment to the observance of human rights."

In the same speech, the President also mentioned the "American dream," to which he had referred, even before he took office, to confirm his belief in traditional American values. But whereas he had previously talked about the "old dream," now he spoke of "reconstructing the old dream," although he did not specify the purpose and aims of this reconstruction. And how

could he have specified them in view of the fact that the "American dream" is nothing more than a traditional political cliche, an element of official rhetoric, when it is referred to by J. Carter, just as, incidentally, by other presidents as well.

Throughout the entire year of 1978, J. Carter constantly asserted that the nation's prestige had been restored and that a "new moral course" had been found. In a conference with the administrators of small-town newspapers and television stations on 30 July 1978, he said: "Our country is stable, our country is strong.... Our country is still the most powerful country in the world, the best country on earth."

In this statement, the President revealed the actual ideological purpose of his "human rights protection policy," camouflaged by abstract moralistic rhetoric. In one conversation with newsmen, Carter abandoned his moralistic stand to talk frankly about U.S. objectives in the "competitive struggle against the communist countries for the hearts and minds of people" and in the struggle to attract the non-aligned states over to the side of the United States.

These statements clearly reveal the pragmatism inherent in Carter's moralism. When the moral terms he uses are decoded, it turns out that the campaign "in defense of human rights" is nothing other than a means of anti-communist propaganda and a cover for intervention in the internal affairs of other states.

Despite all of his assurances about the rise of the national image, however, Carter had to admit that the United States is still experiencing a deep spiritual crisis. In a televised speech on the energy crisis in July 1979, he said: "I want to discuss a threat to American democracy. This threat is almost undetectable by conventional means. It is the crisis of faith that is affecting the very heart, soul and spirit of our national will. We can see this crisis in the mounting doubts about the meaning of our lives and in the loss of national unity. The loss of our faith in the future threatens to destroy the very social and political structure of America."

President Carter has prescribed purely moral cures for this crisis of faith: "The development of mutual trust," "belief in the American dream" and "belief in the future." All of this, according to Carter, should unite the nation in the face of mounting economic difficulties.

The absence of any kind of concrete program at such a crucial time indicates confusion and proves that the moralism which served as the basis of Carter's image has outlived its usefulness. The abstract sermons in "defense of human rights" are completely inconsistent with the persecution of dissidents in Carter's own nation, and his constant avowals of faith in the "American dream" have not saved the nation from mounting inflation, unemployment, the energy crisis and, what is most important, the crisis of faith.

The image of a moralist has stopped paying Carter dividends. American journalist R. Ringer describes U.S. public reaction to Carter's rhetoric in the following way in his book "Restoring the American Dream." "Apparently, Jimmy Carter should be awarded an 'Oscar' for his speech about inflation in October 1978. With an absolutely serious face, he appealed to his audience for cooperation. But what kind of cooperation? He was talking about cooperation between business and the workers, about everything but the deficit accumulated during the two years of his term in office. Carter did not smile even once when he tried to convince the American public that inflation is a mystical force which came to earth from another planet and that no one knows how to fight this unearthly disaster."[18]

The public disillusionment with Carter's moralistic rhetoric was also attested to by public opinion polls in mid-1979, which indicated that Carter was the least popular of all the postwar Presidents.

This naturally raised the question: Now what? Judging by subsequent events, people in Washington are now--on the threshold of the new presidential election--trying to find the answer to this question on the well-trodden path of jingoism. It is no secret that jingoism is a form of extreme chauvinism connected with the propaganda of force, imperialist expansion and interventionism. Imperialist ideologists have always regarded jingoism as an excellent medicine to "unite the nation around a leader." The term "jingoism" was coined in the 1870's, when the question of intervention in Turkey was being discussed in the English parliament. The belligerent tones of this debate were reflected in a chauvinistic song of that time, which glorified the willingness to go to war with the blessing of Jingo (a garbled form of Jesus). As a result, the term "jingoism" became a synonym for chauvinism and imperialist expansion.

English historian J. Hobson gave the following definition of jingoism in his book "Imperialism": "The jingoist is totally obsessed with the risk and blind frenzy of battle.... It is quite obvious that the tangibly passionate nature of jingoism is an extremely serious factor of imperialism. The false dramatization of war and the entire policy of imperialist expansion in order to arouse this passion in the masses occupies a prominent place in the art of the real organizers of imperialist ventures--small groups of commercial and political figures who know what they want and how to get it.

"Blinded by the real or imaginary halo of military heroism and shining claims to empire-building, jingoism becomes the moving spirit of a particular kind of patriotism that can motivate any kind of folly or crime."

When V. I. Lenin read this book, he made a note of this excerpt, underlining certain phrases and adding his note of approval "sic!"[19] In his own works, V. I. Lenin made frequent use of the term "jingoism" to define the extreme forms of chauvinism characteristic of the imperialist bourgeoisie and the labor aristocracy serving it.[20]

Jingoism has served as a platform for imperialist expansion more than once in American history. Theodore Roosevelt was a militant chauvinist who openly called himself a jingoist. When he was still vice-president, he said: "As a jingoist, I can relieve my soul by saying that I would give anything if President McKinley ordered an attack on Havana tomorrow." After he became President, he conducted an expansionist policy. "We cannot stay within the limits of our own borders," he said. "We must increase our strength even outside our boundaries." He was not reluctant to go to war, regarding it as the most effective way of establishing the supremacy of American imperialism abroad: "I would welcome almost any kind of war, because I believe that our nation needs it."

Theodore Roosevelt remained a jingoist until he died. "Speak softly but carry a big stick"--this motto became a symbol of his administration. The "big stick" was then used to settle the "Panama crisis" and other matters of U.S. imperialist foreign policy.

Roosevelt's biographers usually devote an inordinate amount of time to an analysis of his personality, his constantly advertised belligerence and his obsession with the "wild West," with the cowboys, hunters and pioneers who enforced the law with the aid of a Colt pistol. In fact, however, Theodore Roosevelt's jingoism was less a personality feature than an expression of the spirit of imperialist expansion, which stimulated the President's jingoistic neuroses. In this sense, we must agree with I. A. Belyavskaya, who wrote: "It was not instinct, but a conscious belief--that which is usually called ideology (in this case, the ideology of expansionism and militarism), combined with intense feelings of racial superiority, and extreme nationalism--this is what motivated Roosevelt."[21]

Although Theodore Roosevelt's policy is a quite vivid example of jingoism in American history, it is far from the only one. Jingoism as the ideology of imperialist expansion was preached overseas in our day at the time when the war against Vietnam was being escalated. Furthermore, it is completely obvious that jingoism has been resurrected in the foreign policy principles being propagandized today by the administration of President Carter. This is reflected, above all, in the glorification of force as the main principle in relations with other countries. President Carter quite unequivocally declared this principle at a meeting with leaders of student organizations on 19 February 1980. "We," Carter said, "are a nation which believes in force, and our nation is the most powerful in the world on the military, political and moral levels."

Now J. Carter is talking less about the "American dream" than about fast reaction corps, proclaiming Washington's "right" to send them to any part of the world if Washington declares that it lies within the bounds of U.S. "vital interests."

Carter's jingoism was most clearly revealed in connection with the "Iranian crisis," in his decision to resort to a military adventure to "save" the

hostages. This failure, which cost the lives of several Americans, clearly demonstrated how far the President's foreign policy had departed from his moralistic rhetoric. In the speeches of his "moralistic period," he often stressed with great feeling that his term in the presidency was the first time in recent years that Americans were not being sent overseas to take part in military operations. America is bringing the world stability and peace, he declared more than once. Now, in his "jingoistic period," one threat after another can be heard coming from the White House.

A change of images in the careers of bourgeois political leaders is not such a rare phenomenon. It is probable, however, that the conditional and illusory nature of the political image and its connection with immediate, pragmatic interests have never been demonstrated as clearly as during Carter's term as President. It is a long way between false rhetorical moralism and overt jingoism, but Carter covered the distance with unprecedented speed, proving that anything can be expected from a politician conducting an imperialist strategy in difficult situations.

The President's quick change of political images has clearly aroused some anxiety in American public opinion. In an article in the 5 May 1980 issue of the WASHINGTON POST, J. Anderson notes that the operation to "free" the hostages in Iran and the resignation of Secretary of State C. Vance was the result of "the President's obvious inability to take the lead in foreign policy" and of his belligerent policy.

In this way, the preaching of abstract morality evolved into chauvinism in Carter's foreign policy, and "belief in the American dream" turned out to be belief in the idea of the "world policeman." These are two extremes of the same political strategy. The change of political images naturally does not signify a change of political and ideological aims. But it does attest clearly to the dangerous instability of the present administration's foreign policy line and proves that this line is neither intelligent nor realistic.

Moralism "American-style" and jingoism do not contradict one another and are even getting along with one another excellently in J. Carter's policy. He was a jingoist in his moralism, in his attempts to teach the world moral standards, and he is "moralistic" in his role as a jingoist. It was no coincidence that the U.S. President called the April military adventure in Iran "humane." Apparently he will continue to use both images even if there is a definite contradiction here. But imperialist policy has always been full of contradictions.

FOOTNOTES

1. SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 11, 1979, p 3.

2. E. Lefever, "Ethics and United States Foreign Policy," N.Y., 1957; A. Kaplan, "American Ethics and Public Policy," in "The American

Style," edited by E. Morrison, N.Y., 1958; "Ethics and World Politics. Four Perspectives," edited by E. Lefever, Baltimore-London, 1972; C. Powers, "Ethics and United States Trade Policy," in "The Americans," 1976, pp 253-288.

3. J. Guinter, "Moralists and Managers. Public Interests Movement in America," N.Y., 1976.

4. D. Bell, "The Radical Right," N.Y., 1964, p 64.

5. P. Steinfels, "The Neoconservatives," N.Y., 1979, p 36.

6. H. Kissinger, "The Moral Foundations of Foreign Policy," THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY QUARTERLY, Fall 1975, p 27.

7. There is no Russian word which conveys all the meaning of the term "image," which is now widely used in American political terminology and international political discussions. As W. Safire defines it in his "Political Dictionary," the "image" is "the impression a public figure tries to convey, presupposing prestige as a commodity" (W. Safire, "Political Dictionary," N.Y., 1978, p 323).

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20. See, for example, ibid., vol 41, pp 246-247.

21. I. A. Belyavskaya, "Teodor Ruzvel't i obshchestvenno-politicheskaya zhizn' SShA" [Theodore Roosevelt and Sociopolitical Life in the United States], Moscow, 1978, pp 80-81.

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UNITED STATES: THE STATE AND THE NON-MONOPOLY SECTOR OF THE ECONOMY

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 80 pp 26-37

[Article by A. N. Tkachenko]

[Text] The entire history of imperialism's development has been indissolubly connected with the birth and constant growth of monopolies. However, the concentration and centralization of capital and production which lie at their basis and are constantly developing have still not been able to eliminate the non-monopoly sector[1] from the economies of the capitalist countries. This is one of the main reasons for the particular intensity and ferocity of the competitive struggle under the conditions of monopolistic capitalism. Irreconcilable battles are constantly waged, and not only between large companies. The non-monopoly sector is also deeply involved in this struggle. What is more, the monopolies generally employ the harshest methods of economic suppression against small firms striving to strengthen their position in any way possible.

Although the monopolization of economic life has reached an extremely high level in the United States, middle and small businessmen still constitute the largest segment of the American bourgeoisie and still have a considerable effect on the formation and development of socioeconomic and political processes in the nation. In this connection, it is important to analyze the basic aspects of the relationships that took shape in the 1970's between the bourgeois state and the non-monopoly sector of the economy, and to reveal the role of small, mainly industrial, companies in the American economy today.[2] This is particularly important now that the peculiar development of American state-monopoly capitalist in the last decade has forced U.S. ruling circles to make some changes in their policy toward the non-monopoly sector. Within the system of extensive state influence on the development of national production, these circles have had to give increasing consideration to the business practices of hundreds of thousands of small companies.

In this discussion, primary attention is given to the sphere of research and development: The success of small and medium-sized companies in this

area largely determines the nature of their production activity and the scales and relative intensity of their foreign trade operations.

Factors Motivating Interest and Support

Medium-sized and small firms, which represent, according to V. I. Lenin's definition, the "subsoil" of capitalism, are still playing an extremely perceptible role in national economics. According to the data of the Small Business Administration (SBA), small businesses, which number more than 10 million in the nation, account for 43 percent of the gross national product, 48 percent of the production volume of enterprises owned by private capital, and 55 percent of the entire labor force employed at enterprises of American companies. Small companies now constitute 97 percent of all U.S. firms, and more than 250,000 of them are operating in industry.[3]

These general indicators, however, conceal the extremely unstable position of most of the non-monopoly sector. Of all the small firms founded each year, 90 percent go bankrupt in the first year and the threat of bankruptcy constantly hangs over the rest. Crisis-related recessions, fuel, energy and ecological problems and the high rate of inflation in the 1970's complicated the already difficult conditions of this segment of American capital.

The policy of the bourgeois state toward the non-monopoly sector took shape under the influence of many, often contradictory factors and, as retrospective analysis indicates, has taken different directions during different stages. It should be stressed, however, that this policy has never been anything other than a supplement to the measures taken by U.S. ruling circles primarily to defend the interests of monopolistic capital. It is also apparent, on the other hand, that the nature, forms and methods of conducting this policy depend largely upon the actual capability of large corporations to guarantee the attainment of the economic goals and objectives of state-monopoly capitalism during a specific period. The increasing inability of monopolies to cope with the exacerbation of economic conflicts is forcing the federal government to make additional efforts and to find and mobilize some kind of new forces to aid in the resolution of national problems. This is one of the main reasons for the government's present interest in the non-monopoly sector, particularly firms and organizations conducting intensive scientific-production activity.

The attempts made by American ruling circles in recent years to make fuller use of the potential of small companies has necessitated heightened government concern about problems in the functioning of the non-monopoly sector. Under the present conditions of severe economic upheavals, it is no longer possible for the state to completely ignore the pitiful position of many medium-sized and small enterprises. Their mass bankruptcy is costing the American society more and more and is placing a heavy burden on the economy. One of the results of this mass bankruptcy, for example, is the federal treasury's annual loss of 4.4 billion dollars in taxes on profits.[4] The

negative import of these financial losses has increased noticeably under the conditions of the chronic federal budget deficit and the rapidly growing national debt.

The bankruptcy of small and medium-sized companies also exacerbates employment problems dramatically and could increase socioeconomic instability in the nation, as it is precisely the non-monopoly sector in the United States that has become the chief employer of new manpower and an additional channel for the partial reduction of unemployment. Between 1969 and 1977, for example, 9 million new jobs were created in the U.S. national economy; of these, 3 million were created at local government enterprises, 500,000 were created in large companies, and 5.5 million were in small and medium-sized firms.[5] Small companies in the progressive branches of industry play a particularly active role in this respect. According to a recent study conducted by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in conjunction with the Association of Electronic Equipment Manufacturers, the number of hired workers annually rises 24-40 percent in such firms, which is almost 9 times as high as the corresponding indicator for large companies. Furthermore, small firms that have been in business for less than five years have accounted for more than 80 percent of all new jobs in the American economy in recent years (the process of recruiting new manpower slows down dramatically as the company "ages"). These facts have been widely used by ideologists of the non-monopoly business sector as arguments to prove the expediency of broader government assistance for this link of American enterprise.

The need for the active assistance of the non-monopoly sector by federal agencies is also largely dictated by the need to establish more favorable preconditions for the reproduction of monopolistic capital. The development of the multisectorial nature of the largest corporations and the capability of a single monopoly to manufacture a product assortment made up of tens of thousands of items depend considerably on the existence of a technically prepared non-monopoly sector. The existing system of social division of labor, in which small industrial firms serve as the subsuppliers of products with high technical and economic indicators allows monopolies to reduce their overhead costs substantially and accelerate the process of the capitalization of surplus value. More intensive production specialization presupposes the fairly rapid establishment of economic complexes, made up of hundreds and thousands of small companies, closely related to giant monopolies by a single technological process. This kind of cooperation has become one of the most important elements of capitalist production.

In addition, the flexibility of small firms in technical re-equipping, their ability to quickly adapt to changing market conditions and their relatively high level of labor productivity due to the narrow production specialization of enterprises in the non-monopoly sector are all being widely used by monopolistic capital today for the attainment of its own goals.

The existence of close cooperation between large and small companies must always be borne in mind when economic effectiveness in American industry is being analyzed.

The formation of large capitalist associations, which are helping to solve some of the problems now facing the U.S. national economy, are increasingly in the strategic interests of the largest corporations. By surrounding themselves with many small firms, the monopolies insure themselves against severe financial and economic upheavals and create the necessary conditions for their own stable existence. Small and medium-sized firms, which are the first to feel the weight of cyclical fluctuations in the economy, tend to stabilize the position of the largest corporations. The relatively high superprofits earned by monopolies even at a time of unfavorable economic conditions are only made possible by sharp reduction in the financial receipts of small companies and by their bankruptcy.

On the other hand, the mass bankruptcy of small companies with a production output that is narrowly specialized but is often quite necessary to the monopolies, seriously disrupts the production ties connecting corporations with the non-monopoly sector and complicate the economic maneuvers of monopolistic capital. The simultaneous departure of many medium-sized and small enterprises from the market often has indirect negative consequences in addition to a direct negative effect on the economy.

The policy of the U.S. Government is aimed at keeping small firms within the present system of state-monopoly capitalism if these firms manufacture products requiring high scientific input. Government support is supposed to give them some protection from the destructive effects of changing market conditions.

In this connection, a special place in the system of government measures to strengthen the position of non-monopoly sector is occupied by the stimulation of scientific research by small American industrial companies. Despite the leading role of the monopolies in the sphere of research and development, particularly during the stage of the commercial incorporation of research findings, small and medium-sized firms are the "developers" of many important inventions, and this is why federal and local government has been giving these firms more support. A National Science Foundation study showed, for example, that small companies accounted for 147 of the 310 most important technical innovations between 1953 and 1973. Economists D. Stegall, L. Steinmetz and J. Kline have good reason to state that "many new ideas, commodities and processes will actually be the creation of small firms."[6]

The need to support scientific projects in the non-monopoly sector is also dictated by the fact that western European and Japanese corporations, trying to gain access to the latest American technology, often penetrate the local market by absorbing small industrial firms conducting intensive research and development projects.[7] It should be noted here that there has

been a perceptible decline in recent years in the number of new U.S. companies which has attained promising research results. Under these conditions, the transfer of such firms to the control of foreign capital could have an extremely negative effect on the scientific, technical and commercial positions of the United States in the capitalist world.

The need to make fuller use of small companies in the interest of state-monopoly capitalism raised questions about the scales and impact of antitrust legislation. The declining intensity of research and development in recent years and the partial loss of the United States' leading position in the sphere of science and technology have aimed this legislation primarily against the foreign monopolies--and, quite often, national monopolies as well--which are striving to absorb small firms with a promising future in technological development. The General Electric Corporation, for example, was pressured by the federal government to restore the legal and economic independence of two small enterprises whose research and development results were of interest to this monopoly.

The government has taken such actions primarily because some of the monopolies which absorb small companies later refuse to implement their scientific research programs commercially. This restricts the range of scientific development projects and eventually has a negative effect on national technological potential. By employing antitrust legislation in this area, ruling circles are striving to involve all types of firms in more active scientific research, and this does not in any way undermine the leading role of major corporations in the sphere of science and technology.

Many factors of a political nature also lie at the basis of this increasing government assistance. The petty and middle bourgeoisie has always been an important social basis of support for the American government and monopolistic capital. It nurtures the ideological basis of the two-party system of political domination by the financial oligarchy and represents the largest segment of the "silent majority" on which this domination rests. Now that the socioeconomic instability of U.S. state-monopoly capitalism is becoming more pronounced, its significance as a political force is increasing. The federal government has to take this into account when specific political decisions or undertakings are being planned. The problem of consolidating the strength of various segements of the national bourgeoisie is facing the nation's ruling circles with more urgency than ever before.

Therefore, the support the bourgeois government is now giving the nonmonopoly sector is not at all dictated by altruistic considerations, as some American economist have implied. It stems from the need to strengthen the social order and the system of capitalist production in the United States and to heighten the competitive potential of the American economy in the capitalist world.

Assistance of Small Industrial Firms

The existing system of government assistance for the non-monopoly sector covers various aspects of its economic activity. The most prominent place in this policy is occupied by questions connected with the accelerated commercial incorporation of research findings and the perfection of production control techniques in medium-sized and small firms. These objectives, the attainment of which will largely determine the operational effeciency of these firms, have necessitated several organizational measures and the allocation of financial funds by federal agencies. To a certain extent, these objectives are also connected with the present industrial development goals set by American state-monopoly capitalism.

The non-monopoly sector receives some support within the framework of the government policy of turning the results of research conducted by government laboratories over to private capital. The active participants in this process include the research centers of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense, which account for most of the scientific and technical information turned over to small firms. On the whole, however, this assistance is extremely limited. Far from all of the 170 federal laboratories under the jurisdiction of the National Science Foundation (NSF) have contacts with small and medium-sized companies. The need to improve the state of affairs has been pointed out by many American experts. Director D. Austerhaupt of the Industrial Research Center of Arkansas State University says, for example: "There is an urgent need for the transmission of technology by federal laboratories to small and medium-sized firms. Unfortunately, they are not aware of what exists and they are not capable of using and incorporating this technology."[8]

The federal government has allowed small firms to establish various types of consortiums to simplify research and development projects in the non-monopoly sector and to involve more and more small companies in this work. The purpose of these scientific research pools could be the establishment or acquisition of scientific research laboratories and equipment, the commercial incorporation of scientific and technical discoveries, the collection of necessary information, the patenting of research and development results, the purchase of licenses, et cetera. In such cases, these firms do not have to worry about violations of antitrust legislation.

In addition, small firms have filled more government contracts in recent years, largely due to a special program instituted by the Small Business Administration. Whereas in 1969--the first year the program was in effect--they received only 28 orders for a total of 8.9 million dollars, in 1977 the number of contracts had already risen to 2,727 and the total cost was 547.6 million dollars.[9] Surveys conducted in the United States have shown that many companies strengthened their economic position after they received these orders. The number of employees rose in 44 percent of the

firms surveyed, 40 percent were able to increase their assets and 73 percent increased their income. It is quite significant, however, that the bourgeois state is still sending most of its orders to major corporations despite the obvious advantages of the use of some small companies by federal agencies and despite the fact that their profits far exceed their expenditures.

Tax breaks for small companies could heighten the effectiveness of federal assistance in the non-monopoly sector. It was not until the beginning of the 1970's, after an extremely long period of delays, that the Congress passed legislation to this effect, but on the whole, this legislation has not given small firms any significant advantages. This was followed by the passage of a new law in October 1978. Some American experts believed that it would have a noticeable effect on the commercial activity of small firms, particularly in the sphere of research and development. But reality quickly shattered this belief. And **BUSINESS WEEK** magazine again stated that "the more effective resolution of the problem of reduced inventor activity in the United States presupposes a change in tax legislation to encourage the establishment of new small companies."[10] The extreme inadequacy of the legislation that has been drafted attests to the existence of serious contradictions in the policy of ruling circles toward the non-monopoly sector. The latest, extremely conclusive evidence of this was the January 1980 conference on operational problems in small business, convened on the initiative of Washington officials. At this largest meeting of representatives of all levels of American capital, the contradictory and often conflicting nature of the interrelations between the non-monopoly sector and the largest companies was clearly confirmed. The monopolies, which were primarily defending their own selfish interests, said that the offer of even insignificant advantages to small and medium-sized firms would "undermine the bases of free enterprise."

One element of government assistance consists in aiding small companies in the area of production management. This kind of assistance can either supplement federal efforts in the sphere of research and development or be independent of these efforts. The concern over management problems is understandable. A lack of knowledge in this area often nullifies all the efforts of small companies to strengthen their market positions. According to experts from the Dun and Bradstreet research firm, the lack of sufficient administrative experience is the reason for 90 percent of all the economic failures of medium-sized and small enterprises.

At present, 1,860 different establishments, including chambers of commerce, leading research institutes and managerial associations, are offering small firms consultation services with the direct participation of the SBA. In 1977 alone, a total of 25 million dollars was spent on 5,540 seminars attended by 235,000 people. In this sphere, the SBA generally relies on two consultative organizations, uniting retired and employed administrators.

In addition, 200 colleges and universities, including Harvard, Columbia and the University of Pennsylvania, are now offering classes in small business administration.

Federal financial assistance plays an important role in the system of government stimulation of business activity in the non-monopoly sector. Small firms experience serious difficulties in borrowing capital both during the period of their founding and in their growth stage. A fairly complex credit and financing mechanism has been created in the United States to alleviate some of these difficulties. External sources of financing assist the non-monopoly sector in production, technological and sales activity.

The volume of subsidies and other types of financial assistance received by small firms from the government grew throughout the 1970's. For example, whereas total financial assistance amounted to 2.2 billion dollars in 1973, the figure exceeded 3 billion in 1977. The average loan rose 50 percent (from 65,000 dollars to 95,900). According to A. Weaver, the present administrator of the SBA, total financial assistance will double in the next five-six years and the figure might even rise to 10 billion dollars. In all, the SBA extended around 350,000 loans for a total sum of 22 billion dollars in 25 years (from 1953 on).[11] What is more, these loans to small firms generally have a lower interest rate than funds borrowed in the conventional loan market. In 1976-1977, for example, the interest rate was lowered five successive times (from 10.5 percent to 6.625 percent).[12]

Despite the general increase in federal financial assistance in the non-monopoly sector, the majority of small and medium-sized companies are still not receiving it. Studies conducted by experts from the Federal Reserve System and Department of Commerce show that the number of companies representing the most likely SBA clients ranges from 38,400 to 140,000. But far from all of even these firms can expect to receive federal loans. In fiscal year 1976, for example, this administration received around 360,000 applications, considered 56,000 requests and extended only 26,000 loans.[13]

It is particularly indicative that government financial support is given primarily to small firms whose production and technological activity is most in the interests of state-monopoly capitalism at a given time. Besides this, ruling circles are regulating the procedure of the selection of firms for government funds more and more. At present, this selection is conducted primarily by the Office of Management and Budget and the National Science Foundation.

Because the government is unable to satisfy the financial demands of small companies by means of federal budget funds, it is searching out additional sources in the loan market. A major element of this policy is the provision of large banks and industrial corporations with greater incentives to offer capital to the non-monopoly sector. These incentives include various types of financial benefits, tax deductions and federal guarantees.

One of the first steps in this direction was the establishment of the National Association of Small Business Investment Corporations in accordance with a 1958 law. Funds--usually in the form of long-term credit--are extended for education, for the modernization of small and medium-sized enterprises and for more extensive research and development. The high profitability of capital investments in small promising firms is increasing the number of such corporations. At present, according to SBA data, there are around 450. In the last 20 years, they extended loans to 50,000 small firms for a total sum of 2.8 billion dollars.[14] In the 1970's, state-monopoly capital took several steps to strengthen federal ties with private capital for broader financial assistance in the non-monopoly sector. For example, in the Federal Financing Bank established in 1973, which conducts the monetary and financial transactions of government agencies and institutions,[15] a special additional fund was instituted for broader SBA guarantees to the corporations belonging to the abovementioned national association. When small firms acquire financial resources from these corporations, however, they lose a certain measure of control over their own commercial and technological activity. In addition, they must submit detailed reports to the SBA on how this capital is being used.

The chief creditors extending their capital to small firms for long periods of time include insurance companies. They have accumulated sizable financial resources and are becoming more active in the loan market. They are significant in this respect because they extend credit to small and medium-sized firms with little financial potential.

The financial needs of the non-monopoly sector are not limited to long-term loans; short-term credit is also needed for accelerated capital turnover. Small and medium-sized enterprises receive this kind of credit from commercial banks, which generally do not receive the proper federal guarantees and therefore raise the interest rates on these loans--usually by 1.5-1.7 percentage points. Another equally important factor is the trade credit extended to small firms by large industrial corporations. In 1973, for example, the total value of this kind of credit was equivalent to 41 percent of all loans extended by banks.

Although federal aid to small firms has increased somewhat, it should be borne in mind that it is largely intended to accelerate the "eradication" of enterprises operating at a loss, to stimulate competition and to develop rivalry within the non-monpoly sector. The financial support of the research activity of small and medium-sized companies is connected, to a certain extent, with the need to improve the sectorial structure of the American economy. This policy is a common feature of more than just the American brand of state-monopoly capitalism.

As for the bourgeois state's policy of financing research and development in small industrial companies, it is distinguished, just as the practice of stimulating these firms in general, by serious contradictions and, on

the whole, is of a limited nature. Although U.S. ruling circles realize the importance of the research programs conducted by small and medium-sized enterprises, they are expanding the scales of their assistance too slowly. In the last 10 years, the proportion accounted for by small firms in total capital investments in industrial research and development was relatively stable and did not exceed 4-5 percent. Moreover, government sources of financing covered only a third of their expenditures. For large corporations, however, this indicator was much higher--the government assumed responsibility for 57 percent of their research costs. This proportional distribution of federal funds, particularly in the sphere of research and development, is arousing increasing dissatisfaction on the part of small companies, which provide the federal treasury with much of its tax revenues from private capital. The non-monopoly sector's attempts to change the system of unequal economic relations, however, have always been opposed by the monopolies and have led to the birth of new conflicts. In order to soften these conflicts to some degree, the federal government envisaged an increase--but, naturally, an extremely insignificant one--in government financial assistance to small and medium-sized firms in its latest program, proposed in October 1979, for the development of scientific and technical activity in the nation.[16]

Large industrial corporations play a slightly more important role in the crediting of research and development projects in the non-monopoly sector. They accounted for most of the loans extended to small firms for the development of new technology. At present, monopoly capital is providing small companies with 500-600 million dollars a year to finance their research programs. The active participation of these corporations is largely due to the possibility of earning high profits in the event of the commercial success of the results of research and development projects conducted in the non-monopoly sector. The careful selection of projects minimizes their financial risk. In addition, the government provides these investment corporations with incentives. One of the latest reports of the National Science Foundation states: "Small business activity will not only guarantee the continuation of scientific research in important, technically complex fields, but will also stimulate 'risky' capital investments in further work on technological processes if certain difficulties should be encountered in their development."[17] This division of functions, in which the promising research and development findings of small firms are reinforced by the financial strength of monopoly capital, is no longer a rarity. For example, the Sundstrand Company, which developed a transmission with a better design for heavy-duty tractors and was unable to independently complete the "development-production-marketing" cycle, is collaborating with the large and prominent Cummings Engine Corporation, which has an extensive trade network in the nation and abroad.

Therefore, the system of non-monopoly sector support engineered by the bourgeois government covers the spheres of production and science as well as distribution channels. The offer of this kind of assistance attests to a vigorous search by U.S. ruling circles for additional opportunities for

the development of productive forces and the institution of broader government control over the workings of capitalist reproduction as a whole.

Stimulation of the Exports of Small and Medium-Sized Firms

Under the conditions of the internationalization of production and the continuous development of world economic ties, the government, by taking steps to somewhat strengthen the position of small companies in the U.S. national economy, is also definitely stimulating their foreign economic activity. The sharp exacerbation of the inter-imperialist competitive struggle has necessitated additional measures in this area. "No one can deny," L. Armstrong remarks, "that the strong export positions of Japan and the EEC countries are due to broader participation (in foreign economic operations--A.T.) by their small companies."[18] The small and medium-sized enterprises in these countries are also penetrating the American market on a grander scale. For example, the small Japanese firms of Akashi Seisakusho, Okomoto Kosaku Kikai Seisaku, Itsumi and Kako are selling (respectively--A.T.) electronic microscopes, flat surfacing machines, various engineering products and stroboscopes in the American market.[19]

Government assistance of the non-monopoly sector in the development of export activity does not in any way go against the interests of the grand bourgeoisie. On the contrary, it allows U.S. monopolies to preserve the basis of existing cooperative ties with small industrial firms in the conduct of their overseas operations and helps to strengthen the position of major American corporations in the economies of other states.

The stimulation of the foreign trade activity of small companies is also consistent with the desire of ruling circles to make broader use of American technology exports for the sale of commodities abroad, particularly now that American small and medium-sized firms are playing an important role in the export of scientific and technical information. They account for around half of all the licenses sold by American capital in the foreign market. The sale of technological secrets ("know-how") abroad is less risky on the whole than commodity exports. According to many prominent American experts, the scientific and technical achievements of U.S. firms should be given material form in machines and equipment and should be exported in this form.[20] According to the calculations of American business and scientific circles, this should aid in maintaining the United States' technological leadership and improving its balance of foreign trade, which is suffering from a chronic deficit.

As a result of actions taken by the government in recent years, the number of American companies exporting their products has risen perceptibly. According to some data, small and medium-sized companies now constitute 95 percent of all firms conducting foreign economic operations; they account for 15 percent of total U.S. commodity exports.[21]

Studies conducted in 1970's indicated, however, that this group of small and medium-sized companies represents only a relatively small segment of the non-monopoly sector--15.7 percent of all small and medium-sized firms. What is more, most of the small exporter firms send from 1 to 10 percent of their total production output abroad, but the export quota sometimes reaches 50-75 percent.

The rise in the number of small exporter firms in recent years has only aided partially in the resolution of American foreign economic problems. This is why the federal government is continuing to seek new ways of influencing the export activity of the non-monopoly sector, particularly since the overwhelming majority of small firms still encounter many serious difficulties in their export operations. According to SBA data, more than 25 percent of these companies have little knowledge of even the procedure of foreign trade transactions, over 20 percent have difficulty finding profitable sales markets abroad, around 16 percent are encountering fierce competition on the part of foreign corporations, 11 percent cannot find additional sources of financing for export operations, et cetera. The combination of all these difficulties often forces small firms to concentrate only on the domestic market.

The government is taking steps to eliminate these difficulties. In contrast to its policy within the nation, which is based on financial support, in the foreign economic sphere the federal government is assisting the non-monopoly sector by means of broad organizational measures. The chief one is the huge quantity of information transmitted to the United States by American trade missions and agencies abroad. Studies of economic conditions, forecasts of industrial development in various countries and the numerous analytical reports and summaries provided as part of this service are considerably simplifying the choice of foreign markets by small firms and their determination of the best time to sell their products.

This is also the purpose of the assistance given to small companies in exhibiting their commodities at special international trade and industrial fairs. Often, it is here that they establish their first contacts with foreign consumers and search out prospective buyers of their scientific and technical knowledge and research and development results. In addition to simplifying the entry of foreign markets by small firms, the U.S. government is authorizing these firms to establish their own, fairly powerful export associations.

At the end of the 1970's a special foreign trade administration was created within the SBA. One of its chief responsibilities is the maximum implementation of the export programs of the Department of Commerce, the Export-Import Bank, major corporations and associations of industrialists for the continued involvement of small companies in the foreign economic strategy of U.S. state-monopoly capitalism. The implementation of SBA plans in this field necessitated government financial assistance of the non-monopoly

sector in foreign trade operations. Total government export financing was planned at 100 million dollars just in 1979--the first year this program was in effect. It is completely obvious, however, that the increasing attention paid by American ruling circles to direct methods of export stimulation is actually an acknowledgment of the ineffectiveness of indirect government stimulation of the export activities of the non-monopoly sector.

On the whole, government assistance in overseas sales of the commercial products of small companies is aimed at broader foreign economic expansion by American capital, and precisely in the forms that are most consistent with the objectives of state-monopoly capitalism.

Therefore, for several reasons, certain advances were made in government policy toward the non-monopoly sector in the 1970's and there was a slight increase in federal assistance to small companies. Naturally, this does not mean that the protection of the interests of monopoly capital has been relegated to a position of secondary importance. It was and is the primary concern of the bourgeois state. The broader support of small companies attests to the government's desire to draw a certain segment of non-monopoly business into the sphere of its immediate sociopolitical influence, and to make fuller use of its technical and economic potential to heighten the competitive potential of products. At the same time, the expansion of government assistance to medium-sized and small enterprises in various spheres of their economic activity is not canceling out the limited and often extremely contradictory nature of this help, is giving birth to new conflicts in the U.S. national economy and is making competition more fierce in the markets of the capitalist world.

FOOTNOTES

1. This term is used in the article to signify the entire group of small and medium-sized firms. The relative assessment of the size of a firm, on the basis of which it is or is not included in the non-monopoly sector, depends on its operational sphere. For example, the maximum number of employees for small or medium-sized firms in the service sphere is 50, while in the U.S. processing industry, in view of the degree of production concentration, small firms might have a staff of 3-5 employees or 1,000. Enterprises with from 1 to 99 employees account for 88.7 percent of all American enterprises in the processing industry, those with 100-499 employees account for 8.9 percent, and those with 500-999 account for 1.1 percent. In spite of differences in absolute dimensions, all of these firms are distinguished by the use of hired labor and the incomplete separation of ownership-capital from function-capital.

2. Individual aspects of these problems are examined in the following works: "Politicheskaya ekonomiya sovremennogo monopolisticheskogo kapitalizma" [The Political Economy of Contemporary Monopolistic

Capitalism], Moscow, 1975, vol 1, ch 10; S. A. Dalin, "SShA: poslevoyennyy gosudarstvenno-monopolisticheskiy kapitalizm" [The United States: Postwar State-Monopoly Capitalism], Moscow, 1972, ch V; Yu. V. Kochevrin, "Malyy biznes v SShA" [Small Business in the United States], Moscow, 1965.

3. "U.S. Small Business Administration. The Study of Small Business," Wash., 3 June 1977, p 13.

4. "U.S. Small Business Administration. Management Training: Key to Small Business Success," Wash., 1978, p 2.

5. HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW, March-April 1979, p 192.

6. D. Stegall, L. Steinmetz and J. Kline, "Managing the Small Business," Homewood (Illinois), 1976, p 367.

7. More than half of all Western European and Japanese investments in the U.S. economy are connected with this kind of financial operation--NEWSWEEK, 5 November 1979, p 58.

8. "Domestic Technology Transfer: Issues and Options. Prepared by the Subcommittee on Science, Research and Technology of the Committee on Science and Technology," U.S. House of Representatives, 95th Congress, 2d Session, vol II, November 1978, Wash., 1979, p 90.

9. This applies only to contracts covered by "Small Business Investment Act 15USC 637 (a). Section 8(a)," "U.S. Small Business Administration. 1977 Annual Report," Wash., 1978, p 27.

10. BUSINESS WEEK, 17 September 1979, p 21.

11. HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW, March-April 1979, pp 182, 184-198.

12. "U.S. Small Business Administration. 1977 Annual Report," pp 11, 14.

13. "The Study of Small Business," p 23.

14. "U.S. Small Business Administration. 1977 Annual Report," p 17.

15. See I. A. Potashova's report on this bank in Issue No 12 of the magazine for 1978--Editor's note.

16. It is indicative that such a proven fact as the relatively high productivity of the research projects conducted by small firms was virtually ignored when this decision was made. In 1953-1973, according to survey results, the impact of capital investments in research and development (the ratio of inventions to investment dollars) was 24 times as great in these firms as in large corporations. See, for example, "NSF. Science Indicators 1976," Wash., 1977, p 92.

17. "NSF. 1977 Annual Report," Wash., 1978, p 109.

18. "The Vital Majority. Small Business in the American Economy," Wash., 1973, p 372.

19. See "Kaigai shinshutsu kigyo soran," Tokyo, 1969, pp 234-238; THE ORIENTAL ECONOMIST, September 1979, vol 47, No 827, pp 51-58.

20. See, for example, H. Vagtborg, "Research and American Industrial Development," N.Y., 1976, pp 298-303.

21. THE JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 4 September 1979, p 6. In some years these firms account for 25-30 percent of industrial commodity exports.

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THE IDEOLOGY OF THE FEMINIST MOVEMENT

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 80 pp 38-49

[Article by O. A. Voronina]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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SIXTH MEETING OF THE 'BIG SEVEN'

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 80 pp 50-54

[Article by A. I. Utkin]

[Text] The leaders of seven capitalist countries--the United States, Japan, the FRG, France, England, Italy and Canada--met behind dense police cordons in Venice on 22-23 June 1980. This was the sixth annual meeting of the Western leaders.[1]

Since the time of the 1975 conference in Rambouillet, these meetings have taken on certain common features. A certain group of discussion topics has been established, procedure has become somewhat fixed, and some traditions have taken shape. At their annual meetings (1975-1980), the capitalist world's "big seven" have tried to work out a common response to the challenge of the developing countries, the deterioration of economic conditions and the growing strength of leftist forces in various parts of the world.

In this respect, the Venetian "rendezvous" differed from the general run of Western meetings primarily because it was preceded by the new and dramatic incidents of recent months.

In the first place, the West is experiencing discord in views on the future of detente. Differences in the view of the United States, western Europe and Japan in connection with the exacerbation of international affairs led to fierce disagreements. In the second place, the general deterioration of the economic situation, reflected in slow economic growth, the high rate of inflation and the failure of joint energy programs, has considerably reduced the possibility of compromise. In the third place, the actions of Western leaders are definitely less coordinated and the prestige of some leaders has declined. There is no question that President J. Carter now inspires less trust. For example, TIME magazine reported: "It is

1. See SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 9, 1979, pp 24-32--Editor's note.

probable that no other factor has frustrated America's plans to lead the alliance (of Western countries--A.U.) in today's crises more than the contempt our allies' leaders feel for President Carter. They see him as an inexperienced and naive man, a politician who has demonstrated his inability to make foreign policy, adhere to it and act on it."

But the most distinctive feature of the meeting in Venice was the fact that political issues dominated the agenda and were the focal point of the two days of work. As London's SUNDAY TIMES reported, citing sources close to the British government, differences of opinion on two basic matters were clearly expressed in Venice. One of them concerns the definition of detente, which Washington describes as indivisible (the Americans do not want Western Europe to have better relations than the United States with the USSR; in Washington's view, these relations should be "indivisibly" equal--in this case, equally tense--A.U.), and the second concerns the response to the events in Afghanistan. "The allies feel that the strong American reaction was inappropriate and too provocative," TIME magazine reported.

It should be noted that, in general, the reactions of the United States' Western European partners to world events of the last six years--in Indochina, in the former Portuguese colonies, in the Horn of Africa and in the Near and Middle East--have been devoid of Washington's characteristic unhealthy response, in which internal changes in a developing country are interpreted as a direct challenge or threat to the West. In its attempts to impose its own view of the world on its partners and its tendency to confuse dreams with reality, the United States has ignored the very possibility that its allies might take a different approach to processes taking place in some regions and that they might interpret these processes as the natural consequence of the determination of many backward countries to accomplish modernization and development and to get rid of the archaic internal structures of the past.

In Venice, the American President encountered criticism of this dramatization of events. In particular, the Western European leaders displayed a completely different attitude than the American one to all that is taking place in Southwest Asia. As even NATO's semiofficial press organ, FIFTEEN NATIONS, acknowledged, the western Europeans described the American response to events in Afghanistan as "too hard, too military and too insensitive to European political needs."

Virtually all six of Carter's colleagues in Venice opposed Washington's line of exacerbating Soviet-American relations and undermining detente. For example, French President V. Giscard d'Estaing objected to Carter's hard line, declaring that France would "have to protect detente even if all the rest should turn their backs on it." Numerous expositions of official French policy indicate that the French leadership feels that detente would have productive economic and political results and that it would a fatal error to give them up; nothing is worth the sacrifice of all the 15 years

of efforts to normalize the situation in Europe. There is no question that one factor of tremendous importance is detente's gradual deteriorating effect on Washington's military domination of NATO, which is giving the Western European "big nine" an opportunity to conduct an increasingly independent political line in international affairs.

The adamance with which the French position was set forth in Venice was largely due to the formation of the "Paris-Bonn" axis in recent years. The close ties between France and West Germany have given both the French and the West German leaders the ability to stand up to American pressure with "guaranteed rear support" and without the fear of being isolated in the Western world.

Observers were particularly interested in the FRG's position in Venice in view of Chancellor H. Schmidt's planned Moscow trip (the first visit by the leader of a large Western nation to the Soviet capital in an atmosphere of increased international tension in the last year and a half), particularly since it was no secret that President Carter had sent him a letter a week before the meeting, warning him not to be "too soft" in Moscow and not to change Bonn's policy regarding the deployment of American medium-range missiles in the FRG. According to the Western press, the letter was written in a tone that was insulting to the FRG government.

There is no question that a return to cold war would deprive the FRG, as the main Western contracting partner of the socialist countries, of favorable economic opportunities (in 1979 its volume of trade with the USSR amounted to 7.6 billion dollars), which would considerably reduce its potential for economic development and have a negative effect on the domestic political situation.

Whereas Washington preached the "indivisibility" of the Western course (just before the conference began, at an official dinner in Rome, J. Carter warned his allies that Western Europe could not become an isolated "island of detente"), Bonn stressed the differing interests of world regions, singling out Europe for special mention, and spoke of the need to secure this "island of detente." On the basis of this approach, the West German leaders appealed for the more precise definition of so-called Atlantic commitments. Alliances, in their opinion, "are not affairs of the heart" and are not built on sentimental considerations, but on sober political calculations. The position of the FRG government displayed obvious undercurrents of doubt in U.S. diplomacy's ability to save the world from a global conflict. Schmidt declared that the situation "is starting to look more like what was going on in July 1914."

In Venice, American diplomacy made a maximum effort to keep the apparent disagreements over detente from absolutely dividing the West. President J. Carter, judging by comments and opinions, took a strictly conciliatory tone, attempting to make up for the "clumsiness" of some of his previous

moves, such as the confidential letter to Chancellor H. Schmidt, his public criticism of President Giscard d'Estaing's initiatives and other characteristic displays of the American lack of political restraint. If the meeting in Venice is compared to previous Western summit-level forums, the price paid by the American leadership for an external display of the solidarity of its allies becomes obvious: In contrast to its position at previous meetings, the United States did not discuss the role of the FRG and Japan as the "locomotives" of the Western economy, did not demand help for the ailing dollar and did not blame the failure of the attempts to coordinate a Western energy policy on its "obstinate and disloyal allies."

Evidently, President Carter's colleagues also felt that the entire Western system would be weakened even more if they openly displayed their disagreements with Washington and doomed it, to some degree, to political isolation. This is why the top Western leaders decided not to rock the boat too much in today's stormy political sea at the meeting, in contrast to their unequivocal condemnation of Washington's "overreaction" in the weeks and months preceding the Venice conference.

Nonetheless, although the "necessary phrases" were spoken in Venice and the seven countries expressed a common (in the general sense) view, their differences of opinion on the cardinal issue of the present day--the future of detente--did not, by general consensus, undergo any change. The even tone of conference documents and the toasts at the ceremonial banquets in the Doge's Palace could not conceal the fact that these conflicts had not disappeared.

Intensive bilateral talks and negotiations took place at this time in addition to the general plenary meetings of delegations of leaders from the seven Western countries.

Carter's contacts with V. Giscard d'Estaing and H. Schmidt deserves special mention. The most important issues were discussed here and, judging by all indications, it was here that the harshest words were exchanged. For example, the American President's meeting with the chancellor of the FRG, which took place in Carter's suite, was called "quite stormy" by West German representatives. According to the NEW YORK TIMES, Schmidt informed Carter that the President's recent letter was "inexplicable" and that it had left him "puzzled."

The sixth meeting of the leaders of the seven Western countries was, just as previous conferences, confidential. The published official declaration of its participants is an extremely wordy document which is supposed to conceal existing differences. In this document, inflation in the capitalist world is blamed on "several successive and significant rises in the price of oil, totally unrelated to market conditions and culminating in the recent decisions of a number of OPEC members in Algeria" (paragraph 2 of the declaration).

As for methods and ways of combating inflation (called the number-one problem), the published proposals are amazingly vague. They are essentially fond wishes: "Definite budgetary and credit restraint is needed to overcome the inflation mentality. Constant dialogue between social partners is needed for the same purpose. We must organize effective international coordination to implement this policy of restraint." If we just look at the documents of the five preceding meetings, we will find variations on the same theme. In most of the countries signing the declaration, however, the rate of inflation can be measured in double-digit figures, for which there is no precedent in recent decades.

The part of the declaration appealing for "free" world trade and for the resistance of protectionist measures is quite significant (paragraph 30). This paragraph reflects the dissatisfaction, concealed behind bombastic phrases, of the "victims" of Japanese trade expansion and the numerous real and potential conflicts in trade between the capitalist countries. On the whole, the leaders of the seven countries expressed many other good wishes regarding economic issues and promised to "definitely practice restraint in financial and currency matters."

A resolution on the reduction of oil consumption was slightly more specific. Conference participants agreed to not build oil-operated electric energy facilities and set the objective of a lower total oil import balance in 1985 than the previously projected figure. The potential reduction was set at 4 million barrels (1 barrel = 159 liters) a day. The "big seven" hoped to reduce the proportion accounted for by oil in the total demand for energy resources from 53 percent (the present figure) to 40 percent in 1990 (paragraph 17). Considering the recent defeat suffered by Carter's energy program in Congress, however, the skeptical attitude of many observers toward the "big seven's" promises is understandable.

The heads of state and government of the seven countries also adopted joint appeals for "aid to refugees," for the prevention of "kidnappings of diplomats" and for steps to prevent airplane hijackings; all three of these statements are strictly declarative. As for the proposal of the international commission headed by former Chancellor W. Brandt of the FRG on the organization of a summit-level meeting of representatives of the developed and developing countries to discuss coordinated action in economic and commercial development, no joint decision--contrary to predictions--was adopted on this matter at the meeting.

And so the sixth meeting of the West's seven leading countries is over. Its results, in general, clearly demonstrated that the erosion of the U.S. role as the "indisputable leader" of the West is not only still going on, but is also gaining in intensity. The increasing independence of new "power centers" in the capitalist world is giving rise to new disagreements and conflicts in this world. American observers have been made particularly wary and pessimistic by the refusal of Western Europe and Japan to

"drift" in the "Atlantic" direction. The Arab world, and not the United States, is the EEC's chief trade partner, and Japan is looking for new markets in Asia. The allies' loss of trust in the Carter Administration and in the President himself now that Washington's political course has turned out to be so inconsistent and unpredictable is not the only issue, and it is not even the main issue. It is important to stress something else: America's allies are backed up by real economic and political strength at a period in world political and economic history when the interests of Washington and the other main capitals of the capitalist world are conflicting more and more, even though, naturally, the countries represented at the Venice meeting are still united by common imperialist interests.

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ZIMBABWE AND WASHINGTON

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 80 pp 54-59

[Article by V. Yu. Vasil'kov]

[Text] The declaration of the Republic of Zimbabwe, the 50th independent African state, marked the end of the struggle of this nation's people against racist imperialist domination. The new state (formerly Rhodesia) is headed by representatives of national liberation forces, united in the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe (PFZ), which gained the absolute majority of parliamentary seats (77 out of 100) in this February's election.

This event also marked the end of the "latest chapter of the saga of American-African relations," as the WASHINGTON POST put it. The United States has hastened to give the credit for the settlement in Zimbabwe to the "new" African policy conducted by Washington since 1976. The entire complicated process which ended with the political settlement of the Rhodesian problem, however, testifies that the flexibility displayed by the United States in the resolution of this matter, Washington's forced renunciation of its previous open support of racist regimes and its final agreement with the principle of black majority rule indicate only that the present administration takes a more intelligent and realistic approach to African problems, even though the goals of Washington's "new" African policy have never changed: control over the process of change on this continent and, as far as possible, direction of this process in such a way as to benefit the United States' geopolitical and economic interests. This makes the victory of the patriots of Zimbabwe even more significant, as it was won more in spite of Washington's policy rather than as a consequence of it.

During the entire 15 years of the struggle of Zimbabwe patriots, including armed struggle, the United States was on the side of the racists. For 10 years, it was openly hostile to the African national liberation movement, and in the last 5 years it conducted the same line, but disguised this hostility. In 1965, in response to the seizure of power in South Rhodesia (then an English colony) by a white minority headed by I. Smith,

the United States voted in support of a UN Security Council resolution, proposed by England, which condemned this coup and announced the cessation of trade and all official contacts with Rhodesia, the imposition of an embargo on shipments of weapons and so forth, and then subscribed to the UN-imposed compulsory sanctions against Salisbury. These steps primarily signified U.S. support of England as a colonial power. In subsequent years, however, as the African national liberation movement grew, Washington made every attempt to undermine the UN sanctions for the purpose of keeping I. Smith's racist regime in power. In congressional hearings in 1976, a State Department spokesman officially admitted that the United States had violated the sanctions 33 times in the last 10 years. In March 1970, the United States vetoed a draft UN resolution on broader sanctions against Rhodesia, and in 1971 Congress passed the Byrd Amendment to the law on military purchases. This amendment allowed Washington to ignore the UN sanctions and begin purchasing Rhodesian chrome and ferrochrome. The official explanation was that the U.S. economy needed this scarce raw material and did not want to be excessively dependent on shipments of chrome from the USSR. Official statistics testify, however, that shipments of chromium ore to the United States from the USSR actually grew during this period. After 1971, although their relative proportion declined, the shipments still increased in terms of absolute figures. Consequently, the United States' illegal trade with Rhodesia in 1971-1977 was conducted for political, and not economic, reasons. The Byrd Amendment became an act of material and moral support of the Smith regime. Its revenues from exports of chrome to the United States covered Salisbury's entire military budget for many years.

In addition, incidents of covert cooperation between Washington and Salisbury in the military sphere were uncovered from time to time. In 1971, for example, Rhodesia acquired DC-8 and Boeing-720 aircraft, used as military transport planes, from the United States by an indirect route, through Switzerland and Gabon. Incidentally, the Rhodesian army's chief source of military equipment, including American, was South Africa, whose military ties with the United States--also in violation of UN sanctions--are no secret.

During the years of Washington's officially announced boycott of the Smith regime, several American firms with total assets of at least 55 million dollars continued operating in Rhodesia. Against the background of this substantial material support, such gestures as the closure of the American consulate in Salisbury did not disturb the racist regime much. It is no wonder that Senator C. Percy called this U.S. policy a "symbol of American hypocrisy."

The collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire in 1974-1975, after it had constituted a single entity with the "white stronghold" in the south of Africa for a long time, and the resulting increased activity of revolutionary democratic forces in Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa motivated Washington to take a new view of its interests in this region. In

April-May 1976, H. Kissinger, then U.S. secretary of state, made a whirlwind tour of Africa, where, just two months after the failure of the secret U.S. war in Angola, he announced a "new" U.S. policy in this part of the world. In fact, however, he was referring to a more limited undertaking. Kissinger's "new" policy pertained only to the Rhodesian problem and was intended to avoid a "new Angola"--that is, to prevent the triumph of revolutionary democratic forces in Rhodesia.

Although the "Kissinger Plan" for Rhodesia, which was drafted in close cooperation with England and then South African Prime Minister Vorster, included nominal recognition of the principle of black majority rule, it envisaged a government structure which left real power in the hands of whites.

But the United States' attempt to settle the Rhodesian question "immediately," by bargaining behind the scenes with its allies and ignoring national liberation movement leaders, failed.

The new Carter Administration tried to learn a lesson from this failure. In contrast to the overtly neocolonial approach of the previous administration, the second Anglo-American plan on Rhodesia, which was made public in September 1977, gave some consideration to the views of the PFZ leaders. It stipulated that a "transition government," appointed by London, would be headed by a resident English commissioner (Kissinger wanted Smith to fill this position), that the nation's armed forces, including PFZ fighters, would be commanded by the resident commissioner (Kissinger planned to maintain the Rhodesian army and dissolve the armed forces of the Patriotic Front), that UN forces would be recruited to keep the peace and that a "Zimbabwe fund" of 1.5-2 billion dollars would be established. African leaders were consulted when this plan was being drawn up.

The nature of the Anglo-American initiative testifies that the West realized the undesirability of a Rhodesian "settlement" which would rely on conciliatory elements and would exclude the PFZ, as this kind of "settlement" would only lead to a renewal of armed struggle in the nation. This was the reason for the attempts to organize consultations with African leaders--primarily for the purpose of using these consultations as an additional channel for the exertion of strong diplomatic pressure on the Patriotic Front.

The United States had no intention of allowing the liberation forces to win a victory. It hoped to create a "moderate" pro-Western government, in which the PFZ (or its more compliant faction) would have the rights of a "junior partner." Taking the weak position of conciliatory forces within the nation into account, the Western powers concentrated on strengthening their prestige in an attempt to create an effective counterbalance to the PFZ. This was also the reason for the proposal of the "Zimbabwe fund," intended to support the substratum of the black bourgeoisie.

In line with this tactic, the United States began to openly give preference to contacts with "moderate"--that is, conciliatory--elements in Rhodesia. Washington had an extremely positive reaction to Smith's talks with conciliatory Africans--A. Muzorewa, N. Sithole and J. Chirau. The talks ended on 3 March 1978 with the signing of an agreement on "internal settlement" in Rhodesia, which envisaged "settlement" from above, without the participation of the PFZ. A so-called "transition government" was formed. The American Administration then began direct negotiations with the members of this puppet government, inviting them to the United States.

These actions, which contradicted Washington's declared "neutral" stand on Rhodesian settlement, were pointedly condemned not only by PFZ leaders, but also by the leaders of the majority of African states, who repudiated the "internal settlement." Under these circumstances, Washington consented to describe the "internal settlement" in Rhodesia as "unacceptable" in a joint communique on the results of President Carter's visit to Nigeria on 31 March-2 April 1978. Therefore, the previous tactic of formally condemning racists and their puppets while giving them real assistance was still being employed. The most overt sign of this policy was the invitation of Smith to the United States in October 1978. In spite of this extremely negative reaction of the African states and opposition within the United States, J. Carter nonetheless took this step, which even L. Johnson and R. Nixon had refrained from taking. Washington hoped that Smith's trip to the United States just before the election in Rhodesia would strengthen his prestige and influence.

At the same time, more intense efforts were made to break up the PFZ and to include splinter groups in the "internal" government of Salisbury as "authorized representatives of the people of Zimbabwe." This was the reason for the proposal of a new conference on Rhodesia and the modified "Carter Plan" set forth in September 1978.

But the main goal of Washington and the West in general was still the reinforcement of the "transition government." For this purpose, all Western initiatives regarding Rhodesia were shelved. Officially, this took place at the beginning of 1979, but it was actually already being done in 1978. This tactic was particularly significant in connection with the coming Rhodesian parliamentary elections, envisaged in the "internal settlement agreement," and, according to the calculations of the United States and England, was supposed to strengthen the position of conciliatory forces. In these "elections," which were held in April 1979 in an atmosphere of continuing hostilities and a boycott of the PFZ, the white population elected 28 of its own representatives (this was the quota reserved for it), and the Muzorewa group won a general victory, gaining 51 of the 100 seats in parliament. The nature of the "elections" is attested to by the following fact: After the votes had been counted, it turned out that more than 100 percent of the voters in some districts had "cast their ballots." The "election" results were repudiated by the PFZ, the Organization of African Unity and the UN Security Council (the United States,

England and France abstained from the vote). Widespread dissatisfaction existed even within the parties represented in the "election."

In spite of all this, a noisy campaign was launched in the United States for recognition of the Muzorewa regime and the immediate lifting of sanctions against Rhodesia. In summer 1978, Senators H. Baker, B. Goldwater, R. Long, J. Helms, S. Hayakawa and others were already demanding that the sanctions against Rhodesia be lifted. At that time, they lost by just a few votes, and the compromise Case-Javits Amendment ended the matter. It made the cancellation of the sanctions conditional upon "free and honest" elections in Rhodesia and Salisbury's willingness to negotiate with the PFZ. The President of the United States had to lift the sanctions within a month after the formation of a government satisfying these conditions. The results of the April (1979) "elections" in Rhodesia completely satisfied the "Rhodesian lobby" in Congress. On 15 May, the Senate passed the Schweiker Amendment, calling for the immediate cancellation of the sanctions, by a vote of 75 for and 19 against.

But the administration did not feel it would be possible to act this directly. President Carter refused to lift the sanctions by the specified date. Washington's refusal to immediately lift the sanctions (which would have been equivalent to de facto recognition of the Muzorewa regime) was in line with the general strategy agreed upon at a meeting by then U.S. Secretary of State C. Vance with the new English foreign secretary, Lord Carrington, in London on 21-22 May 1979. The main role in conducting this strategy would now be delegated to the Thatcher government. The United States was assigned the function of supporting English initiatives. The new program was made public after the British Commonwealth conference, held in Zambia in August, in the form of the so-called "Lusaka agreement."

These actions were motivated by the following circumstances. The actual result of previous U.S. and English policy in southern Africa was the creation of puppet regimes in Rhodesia and Namibia--that is, stronger white minority rule in a new form. Both Washington and London regarded these regimes as a new political reality which they had once helped to create and which they were prepared to eventually legitimize by means of the tactic of gradual recognition. Neither the United States nor England, however, was satisfied with the Muzorewa puppet regime (or the previous transition government), which turned out to be incapable of stopping the civil war and had no chance of international recognition.

Besides this, the West's previous initiatives were regarded by Africans--and justifiably--as far from "neutral," as they pursued overtly imperialist goals. The new English plan, on the other hand, was officially the plan of the Commonwealth. Furthermore, in view of England's influence in the Commonwealth and the fact that it was officially still the governing power of Rhodesia, it was more convenient for England to implement the plan than for the United States. Certain differences in the approaches of the United States and the English Conservatives to the Rhodesian problem were apparently expressed at the talks in London. Under these conditions, Washington decided to stay in the background.

The London conference on Rhodesia (10 September-21 December 1979) was held without U.S. participation. However, as the WASHINGTON POST reported, "its shadow as an invisible presence at the talks." When, for example, England's refusal to satisfy the demand that land be turned over to blacks for free threatened to break off constitutional negotiations, J. Nkomo and R. Mugabe were invited to the American embassy, where they were promised that the United States would contribute to an international indemnity fund. On 12 December the State Department issued a statement, demanding the immediate acceptance of English cease-fire proposals by the PFZ. Finally, the complete support expressed by Washington for the agreement even before it had been initialed by the PFZ, and the repeal of sanctions prior to the adoption of the corresponding UN Security Council decision were acts of direct pressure on the PFZ.

The results of the Rhodesian elections of 27-29 February 1980, however, were an unpleasant surprise for Washington. The Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), headed by R. Mugabe, gained 57 seats in parliament, the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), headed by J. Nkomo, gained 20 seats, and Muzorewa's party gained only 3. The remaining 20, reserved in the agreement for the white minority, had been filled in a separate election two weeks earlier.

The declaration of the independence of the Republic of Zimbabwe in April, with R. Mugabe as its prime minister was the result of a difficult and persistent struggle by the patriots of this country. As even the leaders of this young state admit, however, this is only the beginning of the long road to genuine independence, which lies across serious problems inherited from colonialism and war.

The position of Washington and the West in general in connection with this naturally makes the Zimbabwe leaders apprehensive. Officially, the United States and England expressed satisfaction with the settlement in Zimbabwe. The flag over the American embassy was raised with incredible speed on the day and hour of the country's declaration of independence. But Washington is in no hurry to take more serious steps. Despite the fact that Zimbabwe has been promised aid of 15 million dollars this year and 25-30 million next year and the energization of private business, U.S. financial assistance still amounts to only 2 million dollars. As the influential American STRATEGIC REVIEW frankly declared, "The time has come to proclaim Western interests and discard the illusion that policy can be based on the African interpretation of these interests." The Western press is full of frankly expressed hopes that the main faction of the present ruling group in Zimbabwe, headed by R. Mugabe, will work toward an alliance with the whites (including whites in South Africa) and the West. The U. S. ambassador in Zimbabwe, R. Kealy, also expressed this wish in his testimony in congressional hearings.

Naturally, the difficult situation in Zimbabwe--the constant threat of invasion by South Africa or rebellion by whites (who still hold permanent

positions in the administration, the army, industry, agriculture and trade) and difficulties connected with economic recovery (which will, according to some estimates, require around 700 million dollars)—is forcing the new government to display caution. It is this situation, AFRICA magazine recently commented, that the West is preparing to take advantage of for subversive activity in the young African republic.

Besides this, the possibility of a different turn of events cannot be excluded. In an interview printed in Nigeria's DAILY TIMES, for example, prominent Nigerian politician S. Ikoku warned that the Mugabe government might be overthrown by a reactionary element with outside support. In connection with this, we naturally recall the tragic fate of the Congo and its first prime minister, Patrice Lumumba, who died as a result of a conspiracy by internal and external reaction, which was supported by the United States. In all probability, the West, after losing, along with its puppets, the first round in Rhodesia, is playing a waiting game, waiting to see which road independent Zimbabwe will choose to follow.

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LOOK OUT: THIS IS TV

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 80 pp 60-64

[Article by Yu. M. Kagramanov]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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THE WASHINGTON PAY-OFF

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 80 pp 65-74

[Fourth and final installment of translation by A. A. Arzumanov of chapters from the book "The Washington Pay-Off; A Lobbyist's Own Story of Corruption in Government" by Robert N. Winter-Berger, New York, 1972, Lyle Stuart, Inc.]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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OPERATION OF PASSENGER AIRCRAFT

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 80
pp 75-85

[Article by S. D. Beshelev and A. A. Morozov]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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BOOK REVIEWS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 80 pp 86-95

[New books reviewed by A. O. Monfor, A. I. Samsin and A. G. Mileykovskiy]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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NON-PROLIFERATION: AMERICAN POLITOLOGISTS' APPROACHES

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 80 pp 96-104

[Article by V. F. Davydov]

[Text] The problem of nuclear non-proliferation, by virtue of its significance for the fate of peace and international security, is arousing attention in leading U.S. scientific research centers and everywhere else. Harvard, Cornell and Stanford universities and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology are conducting joint research projects in this field. New York's influential Council on Foreign Relations has published two works on this subject as part of its "Project-80" program (a study of the problems the United States will face in the 1980's): "Nuclear Proliferation" and "Nuclear Weapons and World Politics." A prominent place in these works is devoted to an analysis of the possible evolutionary variations of international relations under the conditions of nuclear proliferation. Problems connected with the possibility of nuclear proliferation are discussed in several other studies as well, particularly Hudson Institute researcher L. Dunn's "Life in a Proliferating World" (1979), Harvard Professor M. Mandelbaum's "Nuclear Questions" (1979), prominent military theoretician A. Wohlstetter's "Swords from Ploughshares" (1979), political scientist N. Calder's "Nuclear Nightmare. An Investigation into Possible Wars" (1979), Professor A. Kapur's "International Nuclear Proliferation" (1979), and Brookings Institution researcher E. Lefever's "Nuclear Arms in the Third World: U.S. Policy Dilemma" (1979). The possible dangers of nuclear proliferation were also analyzed by scholars attending the Pagwash conference, the materials of which have been published in a book entitled "The Dangers of Nuclear War" (1979).[1]

American specialists explain their concern over the problem of nuclear proliferation by the fact that the continuing buildup of the technical potential of many countries could change the probability of the expansion of the "nuclear club" from a purely hypothetical premise into a reality. According to the estimates of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), there were already 15 "near-nuclear" or "threshold" states in 1975, and there will be more than 20 in the early 1980's. American experts

feel that 30-40 countries will have the technical potential to develop and manufacture nuclear weapons by the year 2000.[2]

Under these conditions, the international importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which has been in existence for a decade, has been sharply augmented.[3] More than 100 countries are now party to this treaty, which conclusively testifies to the great dependence of international security on the prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons on our planet. The second conference of the treaty's signatories is to be held in Geneva in August-September 1980 to discuss the past observance of its provisions and future ways of enhancing the effectiveness of non-proliferation regulations.

But not all countries are party to the treaty. Two nuclear powers have not signed the document--the PRC and France. Around 30 countries, including some on the "nuclear threshold," are still not bound by the treaty. The world public is particularly alarmed by the refusal of South Africa, Israel and Pakistan to sign.

Under these conditions, American scientists are trying to discern the future of international relations and to determine the specific dangers of an increase in the number of nuclear states and the possible negative effects of nuclear proliferation on international security in general and U.S. security in particular.

There are few American political scientists who now doubt that a further rise in the number of nuclear countries could have a ruinous effect on U.S. security. Most American researchers, in spite of differences in their views and beliefs, agree in general that the countries of the world must make a choice without delay--they must either act to control the spread of nuclear weapons or consciously agree to the uncontrolled growth of the risk of nuclear catastrophe. In their opinion, this could be an unavoidable danger in the future, particularly in crisis zones, if one or both of the opposing sides should have nuclear weapons.

In the event of a conflict, it is most probable that nuclear weapons will be used, according to American researchers, in existing and potential seats of tension in the Middle East, in South and Southeast Asia and in southern Africa. The threat of military defeat and the danger of substantial military losses (the destruction of military and industrial facilities) could be the chief motives for the use of nuclear weapons by an adversary. For example, R. Pranger and D. Tahtinen, from the American Enterprise Institute, state in their analysis of the possible evolution of the Middle East conflict that it will "sooner or later be nuclear."[4]

Nonetheless, allegations that an increase in the number of nuclear powers will not necessarily heighten the risk of nuclear conflict can also sometimes be found in American political literature. The analysts who subscribe to this view use approximately the following line of reason: If the two

sides in a hypothetical conflict possess nuclear weapons, a "mutual deterrence" balance is automatically established between them, and the threat of a possible nuclear strike will also make their use of conventional armed forces impossible. Consequently, these authors feel, stability will be maintained in the world. To substantiate this conclusion, they usually cite the example of Soviet-American relations, stating that it is precisely "mutual deterrence" and the establishment of a "balance of nuclear terror" that have kept these relations peaceful. They propose the extension of this model to a "multipolar" nuclear world.

This view is propounded, in particular, by R. Sandoval, military expert from Los Alamos. "Any country which defends its borders by nuclear means and does not have territorial ambitions can serenely, like a porcupine, make its way through the debris of international relations--it does not threaten its neighbors and it does not suffer the risk of being attacked by predators,"[5] he writes. Prominent analyst T. Alexander also tends toward this belief. "A world in which each country has a few nuclear bombs," he wrote in a FORTUNE article, "might be safer because each nation would be capable of inflicting losses that would be unacceptable to an aggressor."[6]

This view on the consequences of proliferation is not exactly new. In the beginning of the 1960's, French military theoretician P. Gallois was already trying to establish theoretical justification for the creation of French nuclear forces by arguing that the possession of nuclear weapons by even small states (including adversaries) would have a restraining effect on their interrelations--that is, the spread of nuclear weapons would make the world community safer.[7]

The opponents of this theory correctly point out that its main flaw is its overestimation of the concept of "strategic deterrence." Right up to the beginning of the Soviet-American summit talks and the relatively recent signing of agreements on the prevention of nuclear war, they argue, the entire history of Soviet-American relations and, in particular, the cold war era, indicated that there was always the risk that a conflict involving the use of nuclear weapons might break out. As an example, they cite the Caribbean crisis of 1962, which demonstrated, in their opinion, that the American strategy of "mutual deterrence" and "intimidation" was extremely fragile and unreliable.

These American experts believe that a country which resolves to acquire nuclear weapons in any part of the world can hardly expect to dominate it for long. According to Harvard University Professor M. Mandelbaum, for example, "China's joining the nuclear club had a definite effect on India's decision to conduct nuclear tests," and this, in turn, stimulated another country to make similar efforts--Pakistan.[8]

Arguing against the assumption that the possession of nuclear weapons by two opposing countries located in "crisis zones" could have a stabilizing effect on their relations, Mandelbaum stresses: "Different types of

arsenals, different rates of their development and deployment, mistrust in one another's intentions and uncertainty regarding the effect of the acquisition of nuclear weapons on the military commitments of other states--these consequences of proliferation can only undermine political stability even more."[9]

Several American experts have also concluded that attempts to establish a technological basis for nuclear potential could stimulate military competition between adversaries. Taking the nuclear power engineering plans of an opposing state into account, a country could decide that it is only a matter of time before its potential adversary manufactures nuclear weapons and that its own efforts in this sphere should be accelerated in order to gain the political advantages stemming from the status of the first country to acquire nuclear weapons in a particular region. This, as the majority of American researchers stress, will bring about a regional nuclear race, which will primarily cause the security of non-nuclear states to suffer.[10] If one of the sides in this hypothetical conflict should acquire nuclear weapons before the other, develop better means of delivery and thereby achieve nuclear superiority over the less "fortunate" side, this, according to former National Security Council associate M. Guhin, could lead to "provocative actions" or to "preventive-surgery" military actions, and this could have far-reaching consequences in the outbreak of a nuclear conflict.[11]

It has also been pointed out that nuclear weapons could be used unexpectedly in conventional conflicts if either side should be able to develop this kind of weapon during the course of the conflict.

Some American scientists believe that intervention in a bilateral local conflict by a third nuclear country could bring about a global catastrophe. The chances of its early prevention by other nuclear states might be minimized due to their fear of becoming involved in the conflict. D. Gompert, formerly Henry Kissinger's assistant secretary of state, feels that other countries can only take joint practical steps to prevent a conflict after the beginning of hostilities.[12]

When American specialists analyze hypothetical conflicts between countries possessing nuclear weapons, an entire spectrum of differing views arises, largely as a result of the uncertain nature of the future international situation. The majority are realizing that "the less nuclear states there are, the stronger security will be."[13] They are literally unanimous in admitting that the growth of the "nuclear club" increases the danger of military conflicts involving the use of conventional weapons, which could lead to nuclear conflicts, and thereby complicates the entire problem of preventing nuclear war on the global scale. According to MIT Professor T. Greenwood, nuclear proliferation "increases the statistical probability of the accidental and unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and errors in calculations connected with nuclear strategy." In particular, he writes, "hostilities involving the use of nuclear weapons would not only be conceivable, but even universal and, possibly, anonymous."[14]

Critics of the present policy in regard to non-proliferation sometimes allege that it is intended to perpetuate the division of states into nuclear and non-nuclear, and thereby ignores the principle of international equality and justice. In their opinion, attempts to prevent further proliferation are motivated not so much by the consideration of its effects on international security as by the desire to preserve the status quo in the sphere of military strength and political and economic advantages in today's world. In this connection, they state that further nuclear proliferation, on the other hand, would "equalize" the status of states and that this would supposedly have a favorable effect on the evolution of international relations in the future. Professor A. Mazrui states, for example: "The path toward military equality first lies through nuclear proliferation in the Third World and then through the global de-nuclearization of each country."15

This view invites criticism if only for the fact that the abstract and often demagogic discussions about "justice" and "equality," proposing that all countries without exception possess nuclear weapons, ignore the important questions of what will become of international security and will this "just" world survive at all under the conditions of global proliferation. The fact that the overwhelming majority of countries in the world have signed the non-proliferation treaty is viewed as evidence that both the developed and the developing non-nuclear states are completely aware that their "vital interests" in the area of national security will be threatened by the spread of nuclear weapons.

Several researchers have correctly stressed that these concepts of "equality" are generally based on the actual desire of a particular country to acquire its own nuclear weapons. In the past, for example, this view was characteristic of ruling circles in England and France. After they had attained nuclear status, their views changed. Now political scientists and politicians in these countries have concluded that proliferation absolutely contradicts the policy of strengthening international security and international detente on the regional and global scales.

When the factors which might increase the danger of the use of nuclear weapons are analyzed, many American scientists generally underline the fact that this primarily depend on which particular countries have these weapons. Some experts are less disturbed by proliferation among industrially developed countries in the capitalist world, which, in their opinion, have close military, political and economic relations with one another. They see the greatest dangers in the spread of nuclear weapons among developing countries, particularly those with authoritarian regimes or internal instability. Several American experts believe it is completely possible that fierce internal political struggles in these nations could cause one particular group to seize nuclear weapons and threaten to use them for the attainment of political goals. Former U.S. Under Secretary of State G. Ball, for example, says the chief danger of proliferation consists not so much in the quantitative increase of nuclear countries as in

the growing possibility of the use of nuclear weapons by "a few irresponsible governments" in the developing countries.[16] Many other American experts, even some who do not agree with Ball, have stated that it would be a mistake to ignore the internal instability of some developing countries, the "messiah complexes" of some leaders, and existing or potential conflicts which could heighten the risk of the actual use of nuclear weapons in one way or another.[17]

Some American political scientists believe, on the other hand, that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the FRG and Japan could have far-reaching political consequences on the global scale, in contrast to the acquisition of these weapons by any particular developing country. But even the latter would increase tension in relations in a particular region.[18]

American political scientists agree that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by countries and regimes whose physical existence is threatened by neighboring states or international organizations constitutes the greatest threat of the use of nuclear weapons. They assign South Africa, Israel, South Korea and Taiwan to this particularly "dangerous" category. According to these experts, in a "hopeless" situation, certain countries or regimes could try to preserve their existence or retain their power with the aid of nuclear weapons as a "last resort."[19]

Various views have also been expressed regarding the degree of danger, depending on the particular approach taken by a country to the creation of its own nuclear potential. States can acquire nuclear status in two ways--either by ostentatiously testing a nuclear weapon, thereby openly challenging other countries and non-proliferation regulations, or by acquiring nuclear devices covertly, as there is no longer any technical need to conduct tests openly. Several American experts feel that the "bomb in the cellar" strategy, which has already been employed by Israel and possibly by South Africa, has a less destabilizing effect on international relations than the open testing of weapons. In the event that the threat of using nuclear weapons is manipulated, however, the destabilizing effects of this acquisition are comparable to the unconcealed possession of nuclear weapons.

In regard to the destabilizing effect of the rise in the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons, Professor T. Greenwood and other scientists who agree with him have said that "any new application for membership in the 'nuclear club' could create local, regional or global instability."[20]

Some American scientists who analyze the consequences of proliferation, however, still sometimes imply that it is more of a threat to the interests of the USSR and other socialist countries than to the United States and the Western nations, since, as they allege, the potential candidates for membership in the "nuclear club" are part of the capitalist world by virtue of their socioeconomic structure and are allies or friends of the United States or other Western countries. The possibility cannot be excluded that this kind of differentiation of consequences could objectively help to substantiate attempts to use nuclear proliferation to attain a strategic situation

in the world that would be more "advantageous" to Western interests. Professor W. Wentz writes, for example: "Non-proliferation as a top priority of U.S. nuclear policy is unrealistic and contrary to American interests. In certain cases, proliferation should be tolerated and even encouraged."[21] Some political scientists are even singling out particular geographic regions in which the strategy of non-proliferation, in their opinion, would supposedly not be in the U.S. interest. For example, A. Kapur, in particular, states: "Non-proliferation in South Asia would be of little interest from the standpoint of U.S. security, while the danger of the normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations is of major significance. The United States should be more tolerant of the spread of nuclear weapons in South and Southwest Asia, just as in other regions, with the possible exception of the proliferation of nuclear weapons among allies who might be called upon to assist in safeguarding U.S. interests."[22]

In all fairness, it must be said that the majority of American scientists do not agree with this opinion, believing that "gambling" on proliferation could turn against Western interests over the long run. Many of them have concluded that one of the first "victims" of proliferation (with respect to the possibility of a new military-political situation) would be the system of multilateral and bilateral U.S. alliances with several countries.[23] It has been pointed out that proliferation increases the danger of U.S. involvement in nuclear conflicts started by its allies and, consequently, will increase the United States' desire to dissociate itself from their political and military actions.

The acquisition of nuclear weapons by capitalist countries located in direct proximity to NATO's sphere of action, just as by a number of its members in conflict situations with one another (for example, Greece and Turkey), in the view of some researchers, could lead to the complete collapse of this bloc.[24] This is an admission that the spread of nuclear weapons among the United States' allies, just as among its non-allies, will seriously affect U.S. military and political interests, will increase the danger of the use of nuclear weapons and the risk of involvement in a nuclear conflict, and will simultaneously diminish American ability to control events.

What effect, according to American researchers, might proliferation have on the evolution of U.S. military strategy, its approach to nuclear arms limitation and its policy with regard to the prevention of nuclear war? Several experts feel that it will necessitate the revision of foreign policy and that it could narrow the geographic dimensions and lower the limits of U.S. strategic maneuvers due to the fear of involvement in a conflict.[25] Former State Department official H. Sonnenfeldt has said that the United States will have to strive for broader bilateral cooperation with the USSR in the prevention of conflicts initiated by third countries as a result of the mounting nuclear threat.[26]

American experts also stress that it is most probable that proliferation will not make any radical changes in the "central strategic balance"

between the United States and the USSR, considering the huge gap between the strength of these powers and that of the new nuclear states. If it should become global in nature, however, the situation could change dramatically. Although nuclear arms control will still be a top priority in the future, the actual possibilities for its accomplishment will be sharply diminished. This accomplishment has already been extremely complicated by the existence of nuclear forces in England, France and the PRC and it could be put in question by a substantial increase in the number of nuclear states.

This is why another possibility exists. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by a number of countries in the world could give rise to military tension in their relations with the present nuclear powers, since even in the absence of missile delivery means, these countries will have access to enough weapons to deliver a nuclear strike. President Nixon's former adviser on scientific affairs R. Garwin feels that if U.S. security is threatened, the United States might give in to the temptation to aim a preventive strike at the nuclear facilities of new nuclear states. The danger of involvement in a conflict would increase if the United States decided to exercise control over the development of a regional nuclear balance by giving a particular country military guarantees, which could also bring about global war in the future.[27] The need to neutralize nuclear threats on the part of third states, American researchers stress, could force the present nuclear countries to expand their defense systems, including antimissile defense, and to develop new military technology. In the presence of a large quantity of sources of nuclear danger, the "hawks" in the United States, as past experience has shown, could exert more pressure on the administration for the further enlargement of nuclear potential. In turn, the military innovations born of proliferation could be interpreted as attempts to gain strategic superiority over the traditional nuclear states, and this would also stimulate a new round in the nuclear arms race.[28] To some extent, therefore, proliferation could undermine the U.S.-Soviet bilateral process of strategic arms control and limitation. Former Director F. Ikle of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency once stressed that an increase in the number of nuclear states would unavoidably complicate SALT, since "the United States and the USSR might not want to take the risk of reducing their arsenals...in view of the growth of nuclear potential in third countries."[29] Under these conditions, the very idea of nuclear disarmament might seem unrealistic and impracticable.[30]

The existence of a large number of countries with nuclear potential, according to several researchers, would make American military strategies invalid. This belief is based on the fact that the strategic picture of a world distinguished by nuclear proliferation would differ radically from the picture of today's world, the relative stability of which is regulated, according to American theoreticians, by the rules and laws of "mutual deterrence." A report of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency underlines the following: "If nuclear arsenals are augmented throughout the world, we will no longer be able to prevent a nuclear strike by deterring one or two potential adversaries. Our mutual deterrence concepts are already fragile and

unreliable, and this will make them absolutely invalid."[31] "The engineers of the strategy of deterrence in the bipolar world," D. Gompert notes, "are unable to extend their formula of stability to the hypothetical existence of many nuclear states."[32]

Some are worried that the "multipolar" nuclear world would seriously complicate the prevention of a nuclear conflict. Its birth could threaten and drastically reduce the effectiveness of the existing system of measures to prevent the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, since a profusion of nuclear threats, according to American analysts, would make it extremely difficult to quickly identify the side responsible. At the same time, the situation in which a conflict between two nuclear countries will be initiated by the actions of a third, anonymous nuclear country might become, according to S. Leus, not the exception to the rule, but a characteristic feature of the future strategic picture.[33] The existence of many centers of nuclear decision-making would indisputably complicate the very process of controlling the use of nuclear weapons to the maximum. Some experts, particularly Harvard Professor T. Schelling, feel that it will be a "wonder" if the world "escapes nuclear war before the beginning of the 21st century," since by this time, if proliferation should occur, no one will be able to control the use of nuclear weapons, "just as we are now unable to prevent the use of firearms in the United States."[34]

Although American experts are more or less unanimous in their views on the effects of nuclear proliferation on international security, there are considerable differences of opinion in regard to the degree of danger it might pose to the United States. For example, F. Ikle, M. Guhin and M. Morowitz assert that the existence of nuclear weapons in countries not possessing missile delivery means does not pose a direct threat to the United States with its tremendous and diverse nuclear potential.[35]

Others believe the exact opposite. It would be a dangerous mistake, they warn, to assume that long-range missiles or strategic bombers are necessary for an attack on the United States. According to prominent nuclear arms expert A. Wohlstetter, "the United States will be within range of even a small and distant country which can use simple cargo ships carrying short-range missiles as a means of nuclear missile delivery."[36] Another expert, T. Taylor, feels that the United States will be "extremely vulnerable," as nuclear weapons could be used by "covert diversionary groups." Many leading American experts, particularly G. Rathjens, M. Mandelbaum, D. Gompert and R. Garwin, have concluded that an increase in the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons will ultimately lead to the relative "leveling" of U.S. nuclear strength, reducing its share of the world "nuclear balance" on the one hand and increasing the number of sources of nuclear danger on the other, and this will certainly have an eventual negative effect on U.S. security interests.

Many American political scientists are admitting, therefore, that the many negative military and political consequences of proliferation in the sphere

of international relations, even in spite of all the uncertainty and difficulty of clarifying these consequences, essentially means the increased danger of the use of nuclear weapons and, as a result, the subversion of international security.

General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium L. I. Brezhnev, stressing the importance of the struggle against the threat of nuclear proliferation to all countries, said: "The spread of these weapons from country to country will not strengthen anyone's security and certainly cannot aid in preserving the relative equilibrium that now exists. It will, however, increase the danger of a nuclear conflict, even just an accidental one. Then no 'nuclear umbrella' can protect anyone from the deadly storm."[37]

Farsighted American researchers are advising the U.S. Administration to assign top priority in foreign policy to the prevention of nuclear proliferation throughout the world and feel that the only solution lies in disarmament, detente and cooperation by all of the sides involved.[38] They are noting with alarm that Washington's present line of instigating confrontation with the socialist and developing countries, of undermining the SALT agreement and of further escalating the nuclear arms race is working against the objectives of the fight for non-proliferation and creating a situation guaranteed to nurture the nuclear ambitions of such "threshold" states as South Africa, Israel and Pakistan. They maintain that American actions are increasing the danger of nuclear war. The threatening parameters of the "multipolar" nuclear world dictate the urgent need to revise this U.S. policy and to make a clear and definite choice in favor of lasting international security--the choice of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

In response to the American researchers who composed the warning "Danger: Nuclear War," L. I. Brezhnev stressed: "Since the time that atomic energy was first used for military purposes, the Soviet Union has consistently favored the prohibition of these and all other weapons of mass annihilation and destruction.... You can be certain that your humane and noble work to prevent nuclear war will meet with understanding and support in the Soviet Union."[39]

FOOTNOTES

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14. T. Greenwood, Op. cit., p 28.

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16. G. Ball, "Diplomacy for a Crowded World," Boston-Toronto, 1976, p 268.

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19. See, for example, M. Gustavson and A. Kramish, "National Survival in a Proliferated World," THE JERUSALEM JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1980, vol 4, No 3, pp 1-12.

20. T. Greenwood et al, Op. cit., p 10.

21. W. Wentz, "Nuclear Proliferations," Wash., 1970, p 173.

22. ANNALS, March 1977, p 95.

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RONALD REAGAN--THE REPUBLICAN CANDIDATE

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 80
pp 105-108

[Article by N. N. Glagolev]

[Text] The national Republican Party convention, which was held in Detroit in July and was based on the results of the 1980 primary elections, nominated 69-year-old Ronald Wilson Reagan, once the governor of California and before this a Hollywood actor, for President of the United States.

Reagan was born on 6 February 1911 in Tampico, Illinois. His father, John Edward Reagan, was of Irish origin and sold shoes. Ronald's mother, Nelly (Wilson) Reagan, a woman of Anglo-Scots origin, was a great theater fan and playgoer. In high school, Ronald Reagan played football and basketball and acted in school plays. After graduating from college in 1932, he went to work for a radio station in Davenport (Iowa) as a sports commentator, and after this station merged with the National Broadcasting Corporation, he reported sports news to the entire nation. In 1937 Reagan's "liquid baritone" aroused the interest of a Warner Brothers agent, and he played the role of a radio commentator in a movie that same year. In the next 33 years, Reagan appeared in more than 50 films, primarily adventure movies. On the whole, the critics gave him favorable reviews, and Reagan's "typical American" looks made him popular with the public.

In April 1942, Reagan was drafted into the Army, but his poor eyesight kept him out of combat. Reagan spent almost all of his time in the Army making Air Force training films. When he was discharged with the rank of captain, he returned to Hollywood and immediately plunged into politics. In his autobiography, Reagan recalls: "I was almost a hopeless inveterate liberal.... I voted for Democrats in all elections, following my father's example."

Reagan's liberal enthusiasm, however, did not last long. In 1947, 500 Hollywood artists issued a resolute protest against the abuses of the notorious Un-American Activities Committee, which had begun to persecute progressive actors and directors. Reagan was not among them. On the

contrary, he was one of those who eagerly cooperated with the committee and willingly testified before it.

Reagan joined the Screen Actors Guild in 1938. The tone of this conservative organization was set by actors and actresses who had grown rich. Almost all of the guild's leaders were conservative Republicans. In 1946 Reagan was elected to the board of directors of the guild, and he became its president in 1947. He was re-elected to this position five times and held it until 1952. During the period when Reagan led the union, CURRENT BIOGRAPHY points out, the movie industry took repressive actions several times against actors who could not deny accusations of membership in progressive organizations. In the 1950's and 1960's, Reagan was the star of a television program financed by the General Electric Company. The quintessence of his performances was a hymn to private enterprise and a lament over federal intervention in its activities.

Reagan joined the conservative Republican camp in the early 1950's. Whereas he supported Truman in 1948, preferring the Democratic policy line to the Republican alternative of Thomas Dewey, and he campaigned for Alan Douglas, a liberal candidate for U.S. senator, against R. Nixon in California in 1950, he supported Eisenhower in 1952 and 1956, and in 1960 he supported Nixon. By the early 1960's Reagan was a frank ultra-conservative spokesman. He regularly appeared in anticommunist television programs, spoke at rallies organized by the "Crusade Against Communism" and took an active part in the work of another reactionary organization, "Young Americans for Freedom." In the 1962 California Legislative Assembly election, he campaigned for John Russelot, a prominent figure in the "John Birch Society." That same year, he managed the Senate campaign of another Bircher--John Wright. In 1964 Reagan was the co-chairman of "California Republicans for Goldwater." Reagan took an extremely belligerent stand on Vietnam. He agitated for the dramatic escalation of the war and demanded that American generals be granted complete freedom of action. "The enemy," Reagan said, "should be afraid that the United States might use nuclear weapons."

The belligerence of this new conservative was very much to the liking of the magnates of California, one of the richest states in the nation and the leader in U.S. arms production. After the 1964 election defeat of B. Goldwater, who had been given unlimited support by California businessmen, the financial bigwigs in San Francisco, Los Angeles and San Diego fixed their eyes on Reagan, seeing him as a potential standard-bearer of ultra-conservatism.

In 1965 a group of California businessmen proposed that Reagan run for governor of California on the Republican ticket. Backed up by big business, Reagan won the election, defeating the incumbent governor, Democrat Edmund Brown. The individuals financing Reagan's campaign included California oil magnate Paul Getty. Four years later, in a book called

"Reagan and Reality," Brown admitted that he had underestimated his opponent, feeling that the very idea that he could be "driven out of the governor's mansion" by a movie actor was absurd. Reagan's election as governor of one of the largest states in the nation turned him into a national political figure, and by 1968 he was already being mentioned as a possible Republican Party candidate for the presidency. Just prior to the presidential election of 1968, however, Reagan took a cautious stand and consented to announce his candidacy only two days before the voting at the national Republican convention in Miami Beach. Nixon was nominated by a majority and then went on to defeat the Democratic nominee.

In 1974, when his second term as governor was coming to an end, Reagan refused to run for a third term and began to prepare for a new round in the fight for the president's chair in the White House. In 1976 he tried to win the Republican nomination away from the incumbent President G. Ford. Reagan's supporters played up the fact that Ford was in the White House as a result of Nixon's resignation and therefore did not have the advantages of the "people's choice." Reagan lost the nomination by 60 votes.

Reagan's 1980 campaign was successful almost from the very beginning. He quickly passed up all of his rivals in the Republican Party and had virtually guaranteed his nomination at the national convention in Detroit long before the end of the primaries.*

Judging by Reagan's speeches during the primaries and by reports in the American press, the Republican candidate's political views are based on the slightly time-worn traditional Republican idea of limited government intervention in the economic and social sphere. The basic theme of Reagan's political speeches is the "fight against big government." He blames this government, in particular, for the rising rate of inflation. "Inflation," he says, "occurs when government spends more than it receives. It will disappear when the government ceases this practice." Nonetheless, he supports colossal U.S. expenditures on the arms race.

In one of his televised speeches, Reagan said: "The federal government has taken on functions for which it was not designed, and it is performing them badly. We need a precise and carefully planned transfer of these functions to state and local government." Above all, Reagan feels that these functions include various social programs, expenditures on education, housing construction and the "medicaid" program. The authority of the federal government, Reagan asserts, should extend only to "national programs" connected with defense appropriations, space research, national resources and environmental protection.

The basic component of Reagan's economic platform is a 30-percent tax cut over the next three years. He feels that this will stimulate production, as a result of which "the number of jobs will increase and the sales volume

* For more detail, see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 7, 1980.

of goods and services will rise." It is true, as observers have pointed out, that Reagan has recently taken a much less categorical tone in proclaiming this idea, obviously on the advice of his economic advisers, who include former secretaries of the treasury J. Shultz and W. Simon, former chairman A. Burns of the Federal Reserve System, and prominent economist M. Friedman. Any cut in taxes, they warn, must be accompanied by the appropriate cuts in federal spending (this is not likely to happen in view of the significant growth of military expenditures planned for the near future).

The Republican candidate and his backers are advocating a "vigorous" foreign policy, based on "more firmness and toughness" in relations with other countries, especially the Soviet Union. Analyzing Reagan's foreign policy aims, as evinced in his campaign speeches, TIME magazine's diplomatic correspondent S. Talbott writes: "Reagan's main foreign policy theme is anti-Sovietism--instinctive, unequivocal and global." "Almost every foreign policy issue," the correspondent goes on, "is associated in Reagan's speeches with Soviet-American rivalry: He advocates military assistance to anti-Marxist partisans in Afghanistan and Angola. In his eyes, Cuba represents the danger of the spread of Soviet influence throughout the Caribbean.... He even tries to minimize the importance of the Sino-Soviet conflict by stressing that both the Soviet Union and China are communist countries and that both want to control the entire world."

Reagan calls "significantly increased" military potential and a stronger economy the two cornerstones of his future foreign policy. He assures his listeners that his administration will strive to "regain superior defensive potential." In principle, Reagan says, he supports the idea of SALT, but he objects to the SALT II treaty in its present form, declaring that it is of "no benefit" to the United States.

Realizing that extremist positions in domestic matters and, in particular, in foreign policy issues can scare voters away, as attested to by Reagan's experience in 1976 and the even more impressive failure of Goldwater in 1964, the Republican contender's advisers are trying to give him the "image" of a "responsible politician" capable of consistent policy without any reversals or extremes. "Reagan and his assistants," TIME reports, "are expecting the rebirth of a traditional paradox: Conservative Republicans with a spotless anticommunist reputation get along better with Moscow than liberal Democrats." Reagan's chief foreign policy adviser, R. Allen, says in this connection that "Reagan will be firm in dealing with the Soviet Union, but he will act consistently and resolutely, without any wavering." References are also being made to the results of Reagan's work as governor of California, where he, according to statements by his supporters, often acted pragmatically without taking conservative dogmas into account.

Reagan's present wife is his second. Reagan has two children from his first marriage to Jane Wyman--a daughter, Maureen Elizabeth and an adopted son, Michael Edward. In 1952 Reagan married Nancy Davis, daughter of neurosurgeon L. Davis, who had a reputation as an intransigent conservative. Reagan lives in a fashionable neighborhood in Pacific Palisades, near Los Angeles with his wife and the children of his second marriage--a daughter, Patricia Ann, and a son, Ronald Prescott. In 1974 he bought a ranch in Santa Barbara for $526,000. During the last campaign, Reagan declared that his personal worth was 1.5 million dollars.

The Republican vice-presidential candidate is Texas businessman George Bush, former director of the CIA, who enjoys the reputation of a conservative of more moderate leanings than R. Reagan.

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AN INSTRUMENT OF AMERICAN INTERVENTIONISM

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 80 pp 109-117

[Article by A. V. Krutskikh]

[Text] Hearings in the House and Senate committees on foreign relations and armed services, several papers published by congressional services and articles in the press have made public the details of the plan to create and use a so-called "rapid deployment force"--an instrument of U.S. interventionist policy in our day.

By virtue of its class nature, imperialism has always tended toward expansion, the forms of methods of which have varied considerably under different circumstances. At times of crisis, when the very foundations of its influence or dominion began to shake, when imperialism confronted resolute public struggle for liberation from the oppression of foreign monopolies, it has invariably resorted to the most frenzied methods of defending its interests--military expansion, the instigation of local wars and conflicts, direct armed intervention and coup d'etats. Military doctrines and the structure of armed services were brought fully in line with the aggressive goals and political methods of imperialist states.

In this respect, the linking of foreign policy goals with military means of their attainment, as practiced vigorously in the international arena by the United States, is most revealing. According to the estimates of American military analysts, the United States resorted to the use of its armed forces, shows of strength and threats to use force more than 100 times just since the end of World War II to attain American foreign policy goals on the most diverse continents of the planet.[1] For example, according to data published in February 1972 in the official bulletin of the U.S. Department of Defense, COMMANDERS DIGEST, American armed forces have been directly involved in 17 military conflicts and "indirectly" involved in another 19 armed confrontations in the postwar period. Sufficient examples can be seen in the U.S. intervention in Guatemala and the Dominican Republic, the landing of American troops in Lebanon and the massive military ventures launched by Washington in Korea and on the Indochinese peninsula.[2]

Apparently, the defeat suffered in Vietnam gave Washington only temporary doubts about the United States' ability to impose America's wishes on other people by means of armed force. In the present international atmosphere, in connection with the revolutionary events in Iran and Afghanistan and the positive advances in Southeast Asia, southern Africa and Central America, louder statements can be heard coming from prominent American officials and political scientists--strongly stimulated, moreover, by the presidential election campaign--appealing once again for a more active American role in the world and for the expansion of the sphere of military presence and its expansion to regions that are sometimes separated from U.S. borders by a distance of thousands of kilometers. "The military strength of the United States," says National Security Adviser Brzezinski, "represents an extremely important factor in the world.... We must guarantee the necessary potential and resources to transfer our strength to wherever it is needed, and to do this in the appropriate form and with the appropriate degree of intensity." In another announcement, he was even more specific in defining the goals of the use of american military strength: "In these dangerous times, our primary objective must be the preservation and consolidation of U.S. geostrategic positions. Our historic mission must consist in directing coming events in directions benefiting us."[3]

The militant appeals of American foreign policy strategists are being physically reflected in the energetic U.S. military preparations that are taking place in many parts of the world. An important element of these preparations is the creation of a "rapid deployment force" (RDF)--a contingent of troops for the "operational projection of American military strength" to virtually any region where there might be a "threat to national interests," interpreted, as is well known, in the most arbitrary fashion in Washington.

The discussion of the need to create this kind of combat force has been going on for a long time in the United States. The implementation of this idea was effectively stimulated in 1973, when the Arab countries imposed an embargo on sales of oil to the United States. The White House sanctioned the creation of the force in August 1977--that is, long before the crisis in American-Iranian relations and the events in Afghanistan, although it is now being asserted that these events were the "deciding" circumstances that supposedly forced the administration to push for action on the RDF issue.

As early as 28 February 1979, the WASHINGTON POST reports, in a special memorandum composed under the supervision of Z. Brzezinski, the National Security Council suggested that President Carter concentrate on the organization of a special "regional security structure" in West Asia (the Middle East, the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean) as a basis for the "conformation of American influence and strength." According to the newspaper, "this was the genesis of the Carter plan, envisaging the augmentation of American military presence and the expansion of operational

approaches for U.S. armed forces to certain crucial spots in a given region in accordance with a group of special agreements, which would not, however, represent a formal alliance." According to Brzezinski's plan, this structure would be backed up by a number of pro-American states (Egypt, Israel, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Somalia, Turkey and others) and by U.S. armed forces deployed in the region. "There was no mention of Afghanistan," specifies D. Oberdorfer, the author of the article, in any of these strategic recommendations.[4]

During hearings in the Senate Armed Services Committee on 21 February 1980, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy-Planning R. Comer addressed the senators on the committee, saying, in particular: "As all of you are well aware, rapid deployment forces are nothing new; we have had them for decades. As we have demonstrated more than once in maneuvers and in crisis situations, we are eminently capable of transferring our strength to distant parts of the world. The wars in Korea and Vietnam provide two convincing examples of this."

The U.S. Navy is a tried and tested instrument for the military imposition of America's will on other states. Marine subunits, responsible for capturing strongholds and performing police and punitive functions, were added to the navy, also in the capacity of "rapid deployment" forces. The U.S. Marine Corps now numbers 192,000 individuals; the corps consists of four divisions of 16,000 individuals each, rear service groups and aviation subunits--4 air wings (almost 1,200 planes and helicopters). The U.S. Navy has around 70 special landing ships for the transport of Marines. The formation of expeditionary divisions of around 43,000 troops in each is envisaged in the event of large-scale amphibious operations.

A special role in the operational transfer of American military strength to "crisis regions" is played by U.S. aircraft carriers. Aircraft carrier assault units, made up of the "Midway," "Kitty Hawk" and "Nimitz" carriers with more than 250 airplanes on board, the "Albany" escort missile carrier and 23 other surface ships, were concentrated in the Indian Ocean in late 1979 and early 1980 to exert military and psychological pressure on the Southwest Asian countries.[5]

When the U.S. Air Force's ability to transfer troops, military cargo and equipment over long distances was developed in the 1950's, the Pentagon created airborne troops, using the planes of the strategic military transport command of the American Air Force and supported by tactical aviation units.[6]

At the same hearings before the Senate Committe on the Armed Services, Lieutenant-General R. Lawson, director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff office of policy planning and organization, stressed that even U.S. tactical aviation, in conjunction with airborne refuelling systems and E-3A early warning, command, control and communications planes, had more than once demonstrated an unsurpassed capability for rapid deployment in any part of the world.

The backbone of the U.S. forces designated for airborne operations is made up of units of the 82d Airborne Division, in a state of permanent readiness for rapid deployment, and the 101st Mobile Division, capable of using its own helicopter strength for operational deployment in "crisis" regions, as well as the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division.[7]

In hearings before the armed services committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives (8 February), devoted expressly to questions connected with the creation of "rapid deployment" forces, Pentagon spokesmen noted that the United States has a technically strong, widely diversified and extremely mobile structure of supply and support services for overseas combat forces, backed up by the global system of American military bases.

The United States has decided to expand the sphere of the permanent basing of its armed forces outside Western Europe, the Mediterranean and the Pacific. The plans for the creation of a special 5th Fleet for permanent presence in the Indian Ocean are being discussed seriously in the United States. Washington has sanctioned the creation of a joint military command in the Caribbean, with headquarters in Key West (Florida) and with jurisdiction over individual units of all branches of the armed services, as one of the ways of heightening the efficiency, control and coordinated action of American "rapid deployment" forces assigned by the Pentagon to operate in "crisis situations" in Central and Latin America. As J. Carter said, the creation of this command will "considerably enhance U.S. ability to react with the greatest efficiency and speed to any military encroachments in this region." Besides this, the Pentagon plans to create multinational naval patrol forces in the Caribbean to perform police functions in this region.

All of the forces listed above--the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, aircraft carrier units and airborne troops--are intended to demonstrate the strength of the U.S. military machine in the world and possess a high degree of mobility and speed of deployment. The speed of their deployment, for example, in the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf zone was learned when a Pentagon spokesman reported at the end of January 1980 that the United States could concentrate ground forces in this region numbering up to 24,000 men within two weeks. The first element of these forces--an infantry battalion (of 1,000 men) with antitank weapons and mortars, deployed in Italy, could be transferred to the Persian Gulf zone within 24 hours. Within the next 24 hours, it could be reinforced with the first battalion of the 82d Airborne Division from the United States. A Marine contingent numbering 1,300, with the use of transport aviation, could be deployed in this region within 48 hours, and another contingent of 2,200 men could arrive within 9 days on landing vessels from the Mediterranean.[8] A Marine brigade in full strength (12,000 men) and its equipment could be transferred to the designated region within 16 days. Approximately the same amount of time would be required for the transfer of a mechanized brigade of American infantry troops (8,000) with all of its tanks and armored personnel carriers to the Persian Gulf zone by air from the United States.

Within 36 hours, up to three tactical aviation squadrons of the U.S. Air Force could be transferred to this region, and an entire air wing could be ready for action within a few days, as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy-Planning R. Comer testified in congressional hearings.

In a U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT interview, Secretary of Defense H. Brown said that the United States is capable of concentrating two aircraft carrier groups in the Indian Ocean within two weeks. The transfer of one brigade of the 82d Division of Airborne Troops to the Persian Gulf zone would take less than a week, and the entire division could be transported there in only 10 days. Within six months, the United States could deploy a combat force numbering 100,000 men in a distant part of the world and equip this force with heavy tank, artillery and air support. Furthermore, rear supply and support units would begin arriving in the potential region of hostilities almost as soon as the combat units had been deployed there.[9]

The facts presented above indicate that the Pentagon now has powerful and diversified invasion forces, prepared for operational use in all parts of the world. Why should it have to create an additional "rapid deployment force"? Responding to this question at the hearings, R. Comer said: "Threats to American interests, particularly in the Persian Gulf zone, require us to develop the ability to transfer our strength to distant regions even more efficiently and more quickly."

Therefore, what is being discussed here is the need to speed up the American military response to revolutionary events in the world as much as modern military transport means will allow. Washington wants constant access to highly mobilized troops, specially trained for punitive operations against the developing countries, which can be used without diminishing American military strength in the "traditional" zones of its deployment.

In his report of 29 January 1980, which accompanied the Pentagon's latest request for budget appropriations for fiscal year 1981, U.S. Secretary of Defense H. Brown noted: "Our military needs outside NATO require us to concentrate not so much on the additional buildup of combat forces as on the development of our ability to transport trained and armed troops over long distances quickly enough so that they can be used effectively at a time of crisis."[10]

The administration's plans to improve American "rapid deployment" forces, as described by H. Brown, specify that the central component of these forces will henceforth be the "rapid deployment forces" specially designated for this purpose. In the absence of emergency situations, this force will not assume the form of a separate military unit with a firmly established personnel composition (see diagram). According to the plan, a sort of "central combat reserve" numbering from 50,000 to 110,000 men will be created, and individual units or subunits of this reserve will be assigned to the force depending on its objectives in each specific situation--ranging from minimal forces necessary only for the "timely display"

of the American flag, to forces capable of conducting a variety of active operations. Lieutenant-General P. Kelly of the U.S. Marine Corps, who was appointed commander of the "rapid deployment force" in December 1979, described the range of possible situations calling for the use of the force quite eloquently. In his words, the corps "must be prepared to respond to unforeseen circumstances in any part of the world...and take geographic features and the nature of the potential threat into account."



General Diagram of U.S. "Rapid Deployment Force" Subordination System and Structure

Key:

1. U. S. Department of Defense
2. Joint Chiefs of Staff
3. Troop readiness command
4. Subordination
5. RDF
6. Command and headquarters
7. Fighting unit and
8. Auxiliary services
9. Units and subunits turned over to the jurisdiction of the RDF command and headquarters in emergency situations and making up the RDF "reserve" at other times
10. Individual commands and troop formation of U.S. armed forces from which certain contingents are designated for the RDF "reserve"

Under ordinary conditions, the "rapid deployment" forces, which will be made up of units and subunits from all branches of the armed services will serve within the bounds of the particular military formations to which they have been assigned; a change in the nature of their subordination--that is, their transfer to the jurisdiction of the RDF command--will be accomplished on the basis of a special decision. Moreover, "whereas it was originally thought that 110,000 American servicemen would be enough to complete the fast reaction scenario, according to new estimates the number should exceed 200,000."[11] Besides this, General Kelly believes that "400,000 reserve personnel will be called up for RDF service in the event of a crisis."[12]

The emphasis in choosing the specific military formations and commands from which individual units and subunits will be included in the RDF "central military reserve" is placed primarily on those which are located on bases in the continental United States and which are not included in the plans for the buildup of American troops in Western Europe and South Korea. Periodically, specific units and subunits, chosen in advance, will be transferred from the "central reserve" to the jurisdiction of the RDF command for participation in maneuvers and operations to coordinate interaction between various branches of the armed services.

The creation of the corps does not mean that other components of the American armed forces will not participate in U.S. imperialism's interventionist actions in the international arena. According to Pentagon plans, RDF troops will interact closely "whenever necessary" with units and subunits of the U.S. Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps which are not part of the RDF. "The Administration feels," wrote M. Binkin (Brookings Institution) and J. Record (Institute of Foreign Policy Analysis), "that highly mobile rapid deployment forces with air support will constitute the core of any more or less large-scale American intervention in the Third World; they will be followed by tank and mechanized units, whose heavy equipment makes them dependent on sea transport." Approximately the same opinion was expressed by H. Brown when he spoke on 19 February 1980 before the International Relations Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives in connection with the Pentagon's request for budget funds for the program of military "aid." The formations of the RDF, in his words, should "make up the nucleus on which other U.S. forces will rely in the event of hostilities."[13]

Forces command personnel were appointed and a permanent RDF headquarters was set up under the jurisdiction of the U.S. troop readines command, which began functioning on 1 March 1980 and is located on Magill Air Force Base in Florida, to oversee RDF forces, to conduct all preparatory and organizational work connected with RDF formation and utilization and to plan its combat operations.

Therefore, by setting up a general operational command structure for the RDF, the Pentagon considerably simplified, accelerated and perfected the elaboration and adoption of decisions regarding the choice of specific "rapid deployment" forces and the determination of their number and the means and methods of their transport, supply and support for the purpose of speeding up the workings of the mechanism for American military interference in internal processes which are taking place in other states and do not meet with the approval of the United States.

The first commander of the RDF, General P. Kelly, defined its central strategic goal as the following: keeping the developing countries from "slipping through America's fingers."

In addition to settling the question of the composition of "rapid deployment" forces, the Pentagon specified ways of providing them with transport means. Although the Pentagon has officially acknowledged that the capabilities of American strategic military transport aviation are 400 percent as great as in the mid-1950's, it submitted an extensive program to Congress for its approval, specifying plans for the further improvement of means for the operational transfer of American troops by air over long distances. As stressed in a special report to the Congress by Defense Research and Engineering Director W. Perry, which was distributed on 7 February 1980, the Pentagon's plans in this area are aimed, firstly, at doubling the present capabilities of U.S. strategic military transport aviation; secondly, at increasing its cargo capacity, so that it can be used to transport more tanks, armored personnel carriers and other heavy equipment; and, thirdly, at adapting it to small and poorly equipped airfields.[14]

The specific proposals of this program covering the next five years (1981-1985), the implementation of which is expected to cost 9 billion dollars, envisage a broad range of operations. The Defense Department has announced its intention to develop the new CX military transport plane, with tactical and technical features superior to the present C-130, C-141 and C-5A transport aircraft. The Pentagon hopes to build 130-200 CX planes at a cost of approximately 180 million dollars each. The Pentagon has requested 80.7 million dollars in fiscal year 1981 to finance the initial technical development of this plane.[15] In order to extend the service life of the C-5A military transport plane for 7,100 hours of flight time to 30,000 hours--that is, to make it suitable for use until almost the end of the century--the U.S. Air Force proposes to modify its wing, and for this alone the Administration is requesting 178.6 million dollars in fiscal year 1981. The cargo capacity of the C-141 plane is to be augmented by 30 percent, its fuselage will be widened by more than 3 meters and it will be adapted for refuelling in the air. By the end of fiscal year 1981, 175 of the planes will be modified, at a planned cost of 25.6 million dollars.

In order to reduce total flight time to the potential "crisis" zone and to dispense with the need to gain other states' permission to land and refuel, on their territory, American military transport planes and tactical aircraft involved in "rapid deployment" operations, the U.S. Air Force has decided to purchase a military version of a civilian plane--the DC-10-KC-10 refuelling aircraft. The purchase of another six such planes will cost 309.7 million dollars. For this same purpose, the Air Force is requesting 59.3 million dollars for the testing of a more effective jet engine for the KC-135 airplane, used for refuelling strategic bombers and other American aircraft in the air. The U.S. Air Force has 600 such planes. To substantiate the need to equip all KC-135 planes with new engines, which should cost 3 billion dollars, the Pentagon calculated that the new and extremely economical propulsion system would make these planes capable of supplying other aircraft with a quantity of fuel that would ordinarily require the use of 300 additional KC-135 planes for its delivery. Another step in the direction of adapting U.S. military transport aviation to the requirements of "rapid deployment" consists in Pentagon attempts to introduce new features into the production of the civilian L-1011 and DC-10 wide-body planes and the Boeing-747 passenger aircraft so that these planes can be easily converted into military aircraft of large carrying capacity if the need should arise. For this purpose, a sum of 78.9 million dollars has been requested for fiscal year 1981.[16]

The miniaturization of equipment with no change in its combat features is also considered as one way of enhancing the effectiveness of transport aviation. For example, a 14-ton mini-tank with a 75-millimeter gun, firing shells capable of penetrating the armor of the most heavy tanks, has been developed for the U.S. Marine Corps. The CX and C-5A aircraft could carry from six to eight of these tanks.[17]

The Pentagon is giving a great deal of attention to the need for the more efficient use of naval military transport means to ensure a quick U.S. military "reaction" to events in the developing states. Considering the fact that the transport of military cargo and personnel by sea is a relatively slow process, American strategists have proposed the "advanced delivery" of combat equipment, ammunition and other military cargo to potential "crisis" zones. For this purpose, they are planning the creation of a flotilla of 14 specially equipped military transport ships, floating arsenals with their holds filled with enough military equipment to supply at least three Marine brigades.[18]

The Pentagon has set forth a broad program of naval construction for the next five years in order to protect these floating arsenals,[19] support landing operations and perform other military functions, including those connected with "rapid deployment." Plans for fiscal years 1981-1985 call for the construction of 97 new warships, including 17 atomic submarines and 40 surface combat ships. Plans for fiscal year 1981 envisage the construction or modernization of 19 naval ships (as opposed to 12 in 1980), of which 13 are combat vessels (11 in 1980).[20]

During the course of hearings conducted on 5 March 1980 before the House Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries regarding the naval military transport capabilities of U.S. armed forces, the American legislators on this committee and the Administration's military spokesmen agreed that more funds would have to be allocated for the construction of new merchant ships and the re-equipping of existing ships so that they can be used for military transport in times of emergency. In the beginning of February 1980, the WASHINGTON POST reported, citing a top-level Pentagon official as its source, that negotiations were being conducted with a view to purchasing or leasing 11 ships of the American Merchant fleet for the needs of the armed forces. These ships are to be re-equipped so that their holds will accommodate the military equipment and ammunition of an entire armored brigade. At the end of 1980 this flotilla is to be rebased in the Indian Ocean to heighten the potential for "rapid deployment" in this region.[21]

American military strategists are fully aware of how strong and organized public opposition could be to the new U.S. "police force" in the world arena and they are not excluding the possibility of the use of tactical nuclear weapons by RDF troops in a "crisis." At present, the Pentagon is energetically compiling the basic plans and scenarios for the use of RDF troops. One of these scenarios--the Pentagon's report on military alternatives in the Persian Gulf--frankly states: "To gain the upper hand in the Iranian 'scenario,' we might have to threaten the use of tactical nuclear weapons or actually use them." At an "unofficial" briefing for the press in the U.S. Department of Defense, a department spokesman made the following reply to a question about the possible limits of the escalation of "rapid deployment": "Yes, we are considering alternatives involving the use of tactical nuclear weapons in regions outside the NATO sphere."

An important part of the U.S. efforts to create the necessary conditions for efficient intervention in the affairs of other states, or, using Pentagon terminology, to "provide the rapid deployment forces with the necessary infrastructure," is the more active search that has been conducted by Washington in the last six months for military bases for its armed forces in locations as close as possible to "potential crisis zones."

The Pentagon now has over 400 military bases outside the United States at its disposal, excluding more than 2,000 support points of an "auxiliary nature."[22] Now that the establishment of new military bases in their traditional form has become a difficult matter, the United States is trying to acquire the right to make use of military facilities (naval installations, warehouses, barracks, airfields and so forth) in other countries.

American efforts have been particularly intensive in the Indian Ocean. In the middle of December 1979, a U.S. delegation headed by Director of Politico-Military Affairs R. Bartholomew of the military policy administration of the State Department (Deputy Secretary of Defense R. Murray was also a member of the delegation), talked with the leaders of Kenya, Somalia, Oman and Saudi Arabia to negotiate the use of military facilities within

these countries by U.S. armed forces. In Kenya, the United States was able to acquire guaranteed access to the port of Mombasa, from which the aircraft carrier "Midway" sailed to the shores of Iran, and to some airfields in the north of this country. In Oman, it was granted the right to make use of a military base on the island of Masira and the port of Muscat. An agreement on access to the military base in Berbera and the port in Mogadishu was concluded with the Somali government. The Pentagon is investigating the possibility of using the port of Djibouti in the region of the Horn of Africa. The Pentagon is quite intent on gaining access to facilities in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.

The United States is conducting intensive work on the construction of military facilities on the Sinai Peninsula, which they also hope to use for their "rapid deployment" forces. It is a well-known fact that Egyptian President Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Begin have already expressed their willingness to offer the territory of their countries in support of U.S. military operations. In the Indian Ocean, the largest U.S. base in this region, the base on the island of Diego Garcia, will continue to serve as the nucleus of American base strategy. A sum of 170 million dollars has been allocated for its enlargement in the next five years.[23]

The facts testify that the work of creating the "rapid deployment force" has been accelerated. Observers feel that the first move, indicating that the United States had begun to implement its announced policy line of "rapid military deployment," was made at the end of January 1980, when the events in Afghanistan were used as a pretext for the decision to send a flotilla of landing vessels, with 1,800 Marines and all of their military equipment on board to the Arabian Sea. In June and July, units of the 82d Airborne Division conducted maneuvers in Florida to perfect amphibious operations. Other military staff operations and tactical exercises also took place. At a meeting with newsmen in June, as the NEW YORK TIMES reported on 20 June, General Kelly described the strategy of the "preemptive strike," which, in his words, will become the basis of RDF actions. This complex of military, political, diplomatic and economic measures is part of the efforts of U.S. ruling circles to stop the process of international detente. This is not a matter of just one striking force made up of individual units and subunits of the U.S. armed forces with the best training for overseas operations; it is a matter of the substantial reorganization of the entire American military machine for the purpose of making it more suitable for intervention and bringing it fully in line with the aggressive course that has recently been openly displayed in international affairs.

FOOTNOTES

1. See T. K. Belashchenko, "SShA: 200 let--200 voyn" [The United States: 200 Years--200 Wars], Moscow, 1976, p 4.

2. See V. I. Bogachev, "Military Intervention as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 6, 1980--Editor's note.

3. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 23 February 1980.

4. THE WASHINGTON POST, 24 January 1980.

5. See G. M. Sturua, "Aircraft-Carrier Diplomacy," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 8, 1980--Editor's note.

6. In January 1980, according to the data of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. Air Force strategic military transport command had 304 military transport planes (70 C-5 aircraft and 234 C-141 planes) of intercontinental range. In times of emergency, these planes could be supplemented by 113 cargo and 96 passenger planes from civilian and commercial airlines (AIR FORCE MAGAZINE, January 1980, p 54; THE WASHINGTON POST, 6 December 1979).

7. NEWSWEEK, 14 July 1980, p 14.

8. THE WASHINGTON POST, 2 February 1980.

9. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 25 February 1980, p 24; 11 February 1980, p 33.

10. "Departme: of Defense Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1981," Wash., 1980, p 11.

11. NEWSWEEK, 14 July 1980, p 12.

12. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 20 June 1980.

13. "Department of Defense Report on FY 1981 Security Assistance Program," Wash., 1980, p 12.

14. W. Perry, "The FY 1981 Department of Defense Program for Research, Development and Acquisition. Statement, February 1980," Wash., 1980.

15. Ibid., pp VII-63.

16. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT, 2 February 1980, p 249; "Department of Defense Annual Report, FY 1981," p 23.

17. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 3 March 1980, p A-971.

18. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT, 15 December 1979, p 2855.

19. The rate of construction will be fairly rapid: two ships in fiscal year 1981 and three a year in fiscal years 1982-1985. The first

two will cost the treasury 213.8 million dollars; the total cost of the program will be 3 billion dollars over a 5-year period. Appropriations of 66.7 million dollars have been requested for fiscal year 1981 for the military equipment and ammunition that will be kept on the first two ships of the series. These ships will carry enough combat equipment for one Marine brigade by fiscal year 1983, enough for two by 1985, and enough for three by 1987 (W. Perry, Op. cit., pp VII-66; CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT, 2 February 1980, p 249; U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 25 February 1980, p 24).

20. "Department of Defense Annual Report. FY 1981," pp 181, 182; CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, 2 February 1980, p 249.

21. THE WASHINGTON POST, 2 February 1980.

22. See V. A. Mazing, "American Bases and Troops Overseas," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 6, 1979--Editor's note.

23. This figure could be five times as high, according to Pentagon experts, in light of recent events in the Indian Ocean basin and the plans to use the "rapid deployment force" (THE WASHINGTON POST, 24 January 1980).

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